New Jersey Employment Lawyer Blog

Targeting Alcoholic Employees for Drug Testing Can Violate New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

November 13, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Late last month, the New Jersey Appellate Division ruled that ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Company may have violated New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) when it fired an employee suffering from alcoholism after she failed a breathalyzer test. The LAD prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because they are disabled. Since alcoholism is a disability, it is illegal to fire an employee because he is an alcoholic. However, the LAD permits employers to fire employees if their disabilities, such as alcoholism, prevent them from performing their jobs or create a serious health risk.

The case, A.D.P. v. ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Company, involves an employee who voluntarily informed her employer, ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Company, that she was an alcoholic and was checking herself into an inpatient rehabilitation program. Based on company policy, ExxonMobil required her to stop from using any alcohol and to undergo random breathalyzer tests for two years. The company did this even though the employee had an exceptional performance history, and there was no evidence she was ever intoxicated at work or that her drinking interfered with her job in any way. When the employee eventually failed a breathalyzer test, ExxonMobil fired her. She then sued, claiming the company committed disability discrimination, in violation of the LAD.

The Appellate Division found there was direct evidence of disability discrimination. Specifically, a manager admitted ExxonMobil required the random drug testing pursuant to company policy because the employee revealed she is an alcoholic, rather than because of anything relating to her job performance. The Court found this policy to be discriminatory since it shows hostility toward alcoholics. Given this direct evidence of discrimination, the court ruled that ExxonMobil has the burden to prove it would have fired the employee irrespective of her disability. Usually the employee has the burden to prove discrimination.

The Court explained that companies have the right to fire employees whose disabilities prevent them from adequately performing their jobs. However, to establish this defense, a company needs to prove the particular employee could not perform her job. In this case, the court found no evidence that the employee was unable to perform her job despite her alcoholism.

The Court also explained that companies can fire employees whose disabilities create a serious health risk. But to establish this defense the company needs to prove, with a reasonable degree of certainty, there is a probability the employee’s disability will cause a substantial injury to the employee or someone else in the workplace. To meet this test the employer has to show more than the fact that the employee has a specific disability. It has to prove the disability was likely to pose a safety risk with respect to the particular employee.

For more information, please see our previous article, When Can A Private Company Require Random Drug Testing in New Jersey?

What Compensation Is an Employee Entitled to if His Employer Was Affected By Hurricane Sandy?

November 6, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

As a result of Hurricane Sandy, many businesses in New York and New Jersey had to stop their operations for a considerable period of time. Now that many employees are returning back to work, they are asking whether they should be paid for the days when their offices were closed due to the storm.

The United States Department of Labor provides a clear answer to this question as it relates to employees who are “exempt” under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). An employee is generally considered exempt if he meets certain requirements regarding his job duties and is paid a salary of at least $455 per week ($23,660 per year based on a full time schedule). The most common exemptions are for employees employed in a bone fide executive, administrative, and professional capacities.

An employer may not withhold pay to an exempt employee because the office was closed as a result of the storm or another natural disaster without jeopardizing the employee’s exempt status. In other words, if a company fails to pay an exempt employee his salary for the period he was unable to work during a natural disaster, then that employee might be entitled to overtime pay if he works more than 40 hours in a week. However, if the employee has accrued vacation or personal time, the employer can require the employee to use that time during his absence from work due to the storm.

As far as non-exempt employees, under the FLSA employers are required to pay them only for the hours they actually worked. Thus, unless they used paid time off, employees who are paid on an hourly basis and other non-exempt employees are not entitled to pay for the days they were unable to work because of the natural disaster. Of course, companies still have to pay employees if they are required to do so under an individual employment contract, a collective bargaining agreement, or a company policy.

Employees who became unemployed as a result of Hurricane Sandy may be eligible for Disaster Unemployment Assistance. The information about the requirements and the application process is available through the New Jersey Department of Labor and the New York Department of Labor.

When Is a Non-Compete Agreement Enforceable in New Jersey?

October 23, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

In a sluggish economy employers tend to use non-compete agreements more frequently to protect their interests. At the same time employees struggling to find a job in difficult job market are more likely to question and challenge the limitations set by their non-compete agreements. As a result, we frequently receive inquiries from employees about whether their non-compete agreements are enforceable under New Jersey law. For example, an employee recently asked if her employer could sue her for violating a non-compete agreement even though the employer fired her only a few weeks after she started the job.

Technically, an employer is not required to give an employee anything more than his or her job, even for a short time, in exchange for signing a non-compete agreement. However, non-compete agreements are disfavored by New Jersey courts and have to meet a few different requirements to be enforceable. Thus, it is impossible to give a short or definitive answer to this client, especially without carefully reviewing her agreement. I can explain, however, the factors New Jersey courts consider when deciding whether to uphold a non-compete clause in an employment agreement.

A non-compete agreement will be enforced in New Jersey only if it protects the legitimate interests of the employer, does not impose an undue hardship on the employee, and is not unduly harmful to the general public.

Legitimate interests of the employer can include protecting trade secrets, proprietary or confidential information, and customer relations. Courts generally will not uphold a non-compete agreement or another form of restrictive covenant if the employer is merely trying to prevent fair competition.

In determining if a non-compete agreement places an “undue burden” on the employee, courts analyze whether the employee is likely to get reemployed in his field somewhere else despite the restrictions of the agreement. The reason why the employee was separated from the job can also be an important factor. For example, courts are much more likely to find an undue hardship on the employee if the employee was laid off or fired without cause, like the client I mentioned above. However, unlike how New York treats non-compete agreements, New Jersey does not have a rule that they are automatically invalid if an employee lost his job involuntarily.

New Jersey courts also have struck down non-compete agreements that limit the public’s right to have access to receive professional advice and services. For example, New Jersey does not permit non-compete agreements to be enforced against attorneys. Although there is no similar prohibition for physicians, accountants, or other licensed professionals, courts will consider whether a non-compete agreement harms the public by restricting its access to professionals in a particular geographic area.

A non-compete agreement only is enforceable if it is reasonable in terms of its duration and geographic scope. What is reasonable depends on all facts in the case, and there are hardly any bright line rules. Non-compete restrictions lasting up to two year are typically enforceable, but longer restrictions can be enforceable depending on the circumstances. The geographic scope can legitimately be limited to any area where the company actually does business, or is seeking or planning to do business. If a court finds the restrictions are overly board, it can rewrite the agreement to make the restrictions reasonable. However, if a court finds the company intentionally made the restrictions unreasonably broad, it can throw out the entire agreement.

Third Circuit Recognizes EEOC’S Broad Power to Investigate Employment Discrimination Claims

October 13, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is entitled to subpoena a broad range of information during its investigations into possible violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Third Circuit is a federal appellate court that handles cases that started in the District of New Jersey.

The appeal stems from an investigation the EEOC is conducting regarding Kroger grocery store’s alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The ADA prohibits companies from using tests when hiring employees if they “screen out or tend to screen out” disabled job candidates, unless the tests are “‘job-related for the position in question” and “consistent with business necessity.” Kroger uses a Customer Service Assessment test that was written for it by another company, Kronos Incorporated, to screen its job applicants. Kroger decided not to hire a job applicant, Vicky Sandy, after she scored poorly on that test. Ms. Sandy is hearing and speech impaired.

During its investigation into Ms. Sandy’s disability discrimination claim, the EEOC sent a subpoena to Kronos seeking information about how the test impacts disabled job applicants. Kronos refused to respond to the subpoena. The EEOC then filed a motion to enforce the subpoena in federal district court. The district court eventually limited the information the EEOC was entitled to receive to information relating to the state in which Ms. Sandy applied and the job titles for which she applied during an 18 month period. In 2010, the Third Circuit reversed that decision, and removed those limitations. It then sent the case back to the district court to modify its order.

But the EEOC again disagreed with the order the district court issued, and appealed to the Third Circuit. This time, it objected to a limitation that it was only entitled to information from any research or studies about the test’s impact on disabled individuals that Kronos “relied upon in creating or implementing the test for Kroger.”

In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kronos, Inc., the Third Circuit again agreed with the EEOC. It explained that the EEOC is entitled to subpoena information during its investigations if it can show that (1) the investigation has a legitimate purpose; (2) the information requested is relevant to that purpose; (3) the EEOC does not already have the information it is requesting; (4) the EEOC has complied with its own administrative requirements; and (5) the information it requested is not unreasonably broad or burdensome. Applying that test, the court concluded that the EEOC was entitled to the information it was seeking whether or not Kronos specifically considered it with respect to the test it developed for Kroger. It therefore instructed the district court to remove that limitation from its order.

New Jersey Imposes New Requirements Under Equal Pay Act

October 5, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Late last month, New Jersey amended its Equal Pay Act to require larger companies to tell employees they have the right to be free from sex discrimination with respect to their pay. The New Jersey Equal Pay Act prohibits discrimination based on sex regarding salary, benefits, and other compensation. Employees can recover double damages (called liquidated damages) plus attorney’s fees if they have been paid less due to their gender.

The new amendment to the Equal Pay Act requires companies with 50 or more employees to post a conspicuous notice to all of their workers, explaining their right not to experience gender inequality or bias in the terms and conditions of their employment, including compensation and benefits. The notice must specifically reference several laws that prohibit employment discrimination based on gender, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the federal Equal Pay Act.

The amendment, which is scheduled to go into effect in November, also will require covered employers to provide all of their employees an individual notice explaining that pay discrimination based on sex violates both New Jersey and federal law. The New Jersey Department of Labor will be writing the notice. Once it is available, covered companies will have 30 days to provide a copy of the notice to all of their employees. Companies also will have to provide a copy of the notice (1) to all employees once per year, (2) to each new employee when they are hired, and (3) to any employee who requests it.

Companies will have the choice to send the notice by email, in print, as an attachment to the company’s employee handbook or manual, or by telling employees it is available on a company Internet or Intranet website. The notice will require employers to have employees sign and return the notice within 30 days to confirm they received, read, and understand it.

Internal Investigations of Discrimination Complaints Might Not Be As Confidential As You Expect

September 11, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

When an employee complains about discrimination or harassment at work, his employer generally has an obligation to investigate. It is common for employers to require employees involved in an internal investigation to keep all information about the investigation confidential. In some cases, this is meant to protect the privacy of the employee who made the complaint and other employees involved in the investigation. In other cases, the company’s goal is to discourage or prevent other employees from making their own discrimination or harassment complaints.

The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently addressed whether these restrictions violate Title VII, a federal employment law that prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.

According to a blog post by Lorene Schaefer of One Mediation, the EEOC’s Regional office in Buffalo, New York recently concluded that an employer committed a “flagrant” violation of Title VII by having a policy that prohibited all employees involved in an internal harassment investigation from discussing the harassment with anyone else. In that case, the employer warned the employees they could be subject to discipline if they did not comply with the confidentiality requirement.

The EEOC explained that an employee’s ability to oppose discrimination without fear of retaliation is one of the most important rights protected by Title VII. The EEOC found the company’s broad policy preventing employees from discussing the discrimination or harassment with anyone else interfered with that right since it implies that an employee could be disciplined if he contacted the EEOC about the harassment.

The conclusion reached by the EEOC’s Buffalo office is only an opinion, and is not necessarily the law. However, it would not be surprising if the EEOC adopted the same position nationwide. In fact, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) also prohibits an employer from imposing a blanket confidentiality requirement for employees involved in an internal investigation because it violates their right to unionize or otherwise work together to advance their rights in the workplace.

In a recent case, the NLRB gave examples of circumstances when an employer can legitimately require employees not to disclose anything related to an investigation. For example, it indicated that employers can require confidentiality to protect witnesses from retaliation, to minimize the risk of evidence being destroyed or fabricated, or to prevent a cover up.
It is often unclear whether you can discuss your harassment or discrimination claim with your coworkers or friends while your company is investigating. However, it clearly would be illegal for your employer to discipline or fire you because you contacted an employment lawyer or assisted the EEOC in their investigation.

Court Allows Lawyer to Pursue Claim Against Port Authority Under New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

September 1, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

A federal judge in New Jersey recently ruled that employees can sue the Port Authority of NY & NJ under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”). The decision is noteworthy because previous cases have ruled that the Port Authority cannot be sued under state employment laws. The LAD is an employment law that prohibits many different kinds of workplace discrimination, harassment and retaliation in New Jersey.

The case was filed by Donald Burke, a lawyer for Port Authority for 26 years. Mr. Burke claims the Port Authority retaliated against him after he (1) refused to lower the performance ratings of two older female employees, Shirley Spira and Dolores Ward, who claimed the Port Authority was underpaying them due to their age and gender, and (2) refused to raise the performance ratings of two of their male peers. He also alleges he objected when Ms. Spira and Ms. Ward were unfairly disciplined, and again when they were fired in a supposed reduction in force.

The retaliation Mr. Burke claims he experienced includes his boss disciplining him for supposedly not doing his job properly and accusing him of not being a “team member.” He also claims his boss threatened to fire him because he objected to the Port Authority’s decision to fire Ms. Spira and Ms. Ward. He further alleges the Port Authority effectively demoted him by eliminating his position as its top litigator, moved his office to an area filled with older lawyers that employees refer to as “death row,” and stopped providing him the resources he needed to do is job. Eventually, the Port Authority recommended firing Mr. Burke. Instead, he resigned. He claims the Port Authority constructively discharged him, meaning it forced him to resign by harassing him and retaliating against him. He eventually filed a lawsuit asserting numerous claims against the Port Authority, including a retaliation claim under the LAD.

The Port Authority is a bi-state agency that was jointly created by New York and New Jersey. The New Jersey Supreme Court has previously ruled that bi-state agencies only can be sued under a state law if (1) the law creating the Port Authority specifically allows it, or (2) the state law is “substantially similar” to a law it the other state. Other cases have ruled that since the LAD is not substantially similar to the New York Human Rights Law (NYHRL), the Port Authority cannot be sued under either the LAD or the HYHRL.

However, in Burke v. Port Authority of NY & NJ, the Court did not discuss whether the LAD and the NYHRL are substantially similar laws. Instead, it ruled that since the purpose of the LAD is to prevent discrimination, and there is nothing in it saying otherwise, the LAD must have been intended to cover the Port Authority. The Court also relied on a 1951 amendment to the law that created the Port Authority, which says that New York and New Jersey agree to allow the agency to be sued for “tortious acts” (meaning personal injuries and similar wrongful acts) in the same way as a private corporation. It therefore allowed Mr. Burke to proceed with his LAD claim.

Filing Questionnaire Can Be Enough to File Discrimination Claim With EEOC

August 27, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

On July 27, 2012, a federal judge in New Jersey ruled that submitting an intake questionnaire was enough for an employee to file a discrimination claim with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The case was filed by Theresa Walker-Robinson, a branch manager for JP Morgan Chase Bank in Lyndhurst, New Jersey. Ms. Walker-Robinson is African-American and 46 years old. She claims her District Manager, Christopher Zardavets, announced he was going to “change the face of the region,” and then began to visit bank branches whose mangers were African American women over 40 years old. Ms. Walker-Robinson complained about Mr. Zardavets’ conduct, but he allegedly continued to come to her branch and make discriminatory comments about her and unfairly criticized her job performance. JP Morgan fired Ms. Walker-Robinson less than a month after she complained to Mr. Zardavets’ boss about the harassment.

Ms. Walker-Robinson filled out and submitted two separate EEOC intake questionnaires. On the forms she claimed JP Morgan fired her because of her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). However, she never filled out or submitted the EEOC’s Charge of Discrimination form.

After the EEOC sent Ms. Walker-Robinson a “right to sue letter,” she filed a lawsuit including claims of age discrimination, race discrimination, gender discrimination, hostile work environment harassment, and retaliation. JP Morgan then asked the judge to dismiss her lawsuit because she did not submit the EEOC’s Charge of Discrimination form.

Under federal law, employees in New Jersey have to file a “charge” of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days after being fired as a requirement to file a discrimination lawsuit under the ADEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, none of those laws defines the term “charge,” or specifically require employees to use the EEOC’s Charge of Discrimination form.

In Walker-Robinson v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (July 27, 2012), the judge ruled that Ms. Walker-Robinson’s EEOC questionnaire was a “charge of discrimination. She primarily relied on an EEOC regulation which says that a charge of discrimination must include:

Full name, address and phone number of the person making the charge;
Full name and address of the person (or company) the charge is against;
Facts supporting the discrimination claim, including relevant dates;
Number of employees working for the employer (if known); and
A statement whether the employee has brought a claim about the same discriminatory practice with any state agency.

The judge also relied on a United States Supreme Court case that says a charge of discrimination also has to ask the EEOC to take action to remedy the discrimination. The judge ruled that Ms. Walker-Robinson’s EEOC questionnaires met all of those requirements.

The judge also permitted Ms. Walker-Robinson to pursue her claims of gender discrimination, race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Even though Ms. Walker-Robinson did not mention those claims in her EEOC questionnaires, the judge found they were related to the same facts as her age discrimination claim, and the EEOC should have addressed those claims during its investigation. The judge therefore denied JP Morgan’s motion to dismiss Ms. Walker-Robinson’s case.

Court Clarifies Important Issues Under FMLA

August 19, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Earlier this month, in Lichtenstein v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals answered several important questions under the Family & Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA is a federal law that requires larger companies to allow qualified employees to take time off for pregnancy, their own serious health condition, or to care for an immediate family member with a serious health condition. The Third Circuit is the federal appellate court that handles appeals from federal court in New Jersey.

What is Enough Information to Request an FMLA Leave?

One issue the court clarified is what an employee is required to say to request an FMLA leave. It ruled that an employee only has to provide the employer enough information for the company to determine that the FLMA might apply. At that point, if the employer needs more information to determine whether the FMLA actually applies, it has to ask the employee. Applying that rule, the court found Jamie Lichtenstein had requested an FMLA leave when she told her employer, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC), that (1) her mother was in the emergency room, (2) her mother had been brought to the hospital by ambulance, and (3) she would not be able to work that day. The court ruled that although this was not necessarily enough information for UPMC to determine whether Ms. Lichtenstein was entitled to an FMLA leave, it was enough information that UMPC had to at least ask her for more information.

What Does it Mean to “Care For” a Family Member?

The court also clarified what it means to “care for” a family member with a serious health condition. It explained that “caring” not only includes providing physical care, but also “psychological comfort and reassurance,” to a family member with a serious health condition. The court concluded that a jury could find UPMC should have understood the reason Ms. Lichtenstein was at the hospital with her mother was to provide her emotional comfort and reassurance, and therefore was a request for an FMLA leave.

How Can You Prove Your Employer Retaliated Against You For Requesting an FMLA Leave?

The court also discussed how an employee can prove that the decision to fire her was based on her request for an FMLA leave. First, it explained that that an employee can prove this based solely on evidence of the timing between her request for an FMLA leave and the company’s decision to fire her, but only if the timing is “unusually suggestive.” Since UPMC fired Ms. Lichtenstein within a week after she requested an FMLA leave, the court found that alone could be enough for a jury to find in her favor.

Second, the court explained that even when the timing is not enough by itself to prove the employer fired the employee because she took an FMLA leave, the employee can use other evidence to prove her claim. For example, Ms. Lichtenstein could use the fact that the company stated that her absence on the day when she was at the hospital with her mother was one of the reasons it fired her. She also could use the fact that her supervisor initially claimed she made the decision to fire Ms. Lichtenstein before she requested an FMLA leave, but later testified that she could not remember when she made the decision.

Notably, the court ruled that Ms. Lichtenstein can proceed with her FMLA claim even though she admittedly had numerous unexcused absences and was repeatedly late to work before she ever requested an FMLA leave. It explained that the company had every right to fire her for those reasons. However, it is illegal to consider an employee’s FMLA leave as a “negative factor” in a decision to fire an employee, even if there are other factors that led to the decision. Since there is evidence suggesting that Ms. Lichtenstein’s FMLA leave could have been the “straw that broke the camel’s back,” the court ruled that a jury must decide whether UPMC used her FMLA as a negative factor in its decision to fire her.

New Jersey Judge Allows Disability Discrimination Case to Proceed

August 14, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Recently, a federal judge in the District of New Jersey allowed an employee to continue with his disability discrimination case, largely based on testimony that his boss told him he was “too sick” to do his job. The case, Estate of Fajge v. Dick Greenfield Dodge, Inc., was filed on behalf of Henry Fajge, a car salesman for Dick Greenfield Dodge.

The Facts of the Case

Before he started working for the dealership, Mr. Fajge had a history of mini-strokes (or transient ischemic attacks), coronary artery disease and hypertension, and had suffered a heart attack.
Three weeks after he started the job, he suffered another mini stroke. He was taken to the emergency room by ambulance, and remained in the hospital for five days before his doctor cleared him to return to work.

Within a week after he returned to work, the dealership had to call another ambulance for Mr. Fajge because he was not feeling well. After examining him, the paramedics concluded he was fine. According to Mr. Fajge, his boss called him at home the next day, and said he did not think he was strong or healthy enough to continue doing his job, and as a result they were going to have to “part company.” Although his boss denied making that statement, he admitted he called Mr. Fajge to ask him how he was doing. When his boss was asked at his deposition if he calls other employees at home when they are out sick, he answered “No. But most employees don’t like nearly drop over dead in front of me two times in a row in less than a month.”

Approximately two weeks later, the dealership fired Mr. Fajge. It claimed it did so because of his job performance. For example, his supervisors testified that he wasted a lot of time in his office instead of trying to sell cars, and he was often on the internet, including occasionally looking at pornography at work.

Mr. Fajge then filed a lawsuit in which he alleged the dealership fired him because he is disabled, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). Unfortunately, Mr. Fajge passed away while the case was pending. However, his estate decided to pursue his discrimination lawsuit on his behalf.

The Judge’s Ruling

Without deciding whether Mr. Fajge actually had a disability, the Judge found he was protected by the LAD because the dealership perceived him to be disabled. The LAD prohibits employers from discriminating against employees who they believe are disabled, whether or not they are actually disabled. The Judge also found there was enough evidence for a jury to find the dealership fired Mr. Fajge because it believed he was disabled. This includes Mr. Fajge’s testimony that his boss said he did not think he was strong enough to perform his job, and his boss’s testimony that Mr. Fajge twice nearly dropped dead in front of him. The Judge also relied on a company document that said it fired Mr. Fajge because of his “inability to work the hours required,” and inconsistencies in the dealership’s evidence about Mr. Fajge’s supposed poor performance. The Judge’s ruling paves the way for the case to go to trial, where a jury will decide whether the dealership fired Mr. Fajge because of an actual or perceived disability.