Articles Posted in Reasonable Accommodations

Earlier this month, in Pritchett v. State, the New Jersey Supreme Court confirmed that the state of New Jersey and municipalities remain subject to punitive damages under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”).

Shelley Pritchett worked for the State of New Jersey as a Senior Corrections Officer at the Juvenile Justice Center (“JJC”).  In 2011, Officer Pritchett suffered back, knee and neck injuries when she broke up a fight between two inmates.  She went on a workers’ compensation leave as a result.  Her doctor subsequently diagnosed her with multiple sclerosis. As a result, she sought to extend her medical leave by approximately 4 ½ months.  However, the JJC denied her request, and instead offered to extend her leave by only about a month and told her that if she was not medically cleared to return to work by then she would have to resign.

Female Correction Officer Disability Discrimination AppealOfficer Pritchett was unable to return to work within the additional time JJC had granted.  However, she told the JJC she did not want to resign.  In response, JJC told her that if she did not resign by the end of the week, it would initiate disciplinary proceedings to fire her, and she would lose her pension.  In response, Officer Pritchett applied for a disability retirement.

Today, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that an employee does not need to suffer an adverse employment action to win a claim based on the employer’s failure to accommodate her disability under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”).

Teacher denied reasonable accommoation for her disability.Mary Richter is a teacher for the Oakland Board of Education.  Ms. Richter has Type 1 diabetes.  She repeatedly asked the school principal to allow her to change her schedule so she could eat lunch earlier to help her manage her blood sugar levels.  However, the school did not accommodate her an accommodation for her diabetes.

Ms. Richter subsequently experienced a hypoglycemic event in a classroom.  As a result, she fainted, hit her head on a table, and sustained very serious permanent injuries, including:

The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees to permit them to be able to continue to perform their jobs.

Ordinarily, an employee who brings a discrimination case under the LAD has to prove the discrimination led to an adverse employment action such as being fired, demoted, or passed up for a promotion.  However, in a recent published opinion, Richter v. Oakland Board of Education, New Jersey’s Appellate Division ruled that an employee can recover damages for a physical injury caused by the employer’s failure to accommodate her disability without having to prove she suffered an adverse employment action.

Mary Richter is a science teacher for the Oakland Board of Education at Valley Middle School.  During the first marking period of the 2012/2013 school year, her lunch period was scheduled to begin at 1:05 p.m.  Ms. Richter has Type I diabetes and believed eating her lunch that late in the day would negatively impact her blood sugar levels.  Accordingly, she asked her school’s principal, Gregg Desiderio, to allow her to eat her lunch earlier in the day.

A recent published opinion from the New Jersey Appellate Division recognizes that although the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for employees’ sincerely held religious belief, that requirement does not apply when the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer.

Camden County Correctional FacilityLinda Tisby began working for the Camden County Correctional Facility (“Camden”) in 2002.  In 2015, she began practicing the Sunni Muslim faith.  In May 2015, she came to work wearing a Muslim khimar, which is a tight fitting head covering, but without a veil.  However, Camden has a policy regarding uniforms which prohibits employees from wearing any hats other than the ones issued by their departments.  Accordingly, Ms. Tisby’s supervisor told her she was violating Camden’s uniform policy, and could not work unless she removed her khimar.  When Ms. Tisby refused, her supervisor sent her home.  After this happened three more times, Camden suspended her for two days.

Camden then told Ms. Tisby that it considered her to have requested an accommodation for her religious belief pursuant to the LAD.  But while the employer recognized Ms. Tisby had a sincerely held religious belief, it denied her request on the basis that it would “constitute an undue hardship to the Department to allow an officer to wear head-coverings or other non-uniform clothing.”  Since Ms. Tisby refused to work without wearing her khimar, Camden fired her.

A recent case out of the District of New Jersey provides a good example both of an employee’s right to a reasonable accommodation for her disability, and the employer’s obligations once an employee requests one.

Penelope Bertolotti worked for AutoZone, Inc. in its human resources department. Ms. Bertolotti suffers from a disability, gastroparesis, an incurable disease that impacts her ability to digest food and beverages. As a result, she wears a pacemaker to help with her digestion.

In October 2012, Ms. Bertolotti took a two week medical leave due to her illness. She returned to work for approximately one week, but then needed to go out on another medical leave.

New Jersey’s Appellate Division recently ruled that a treating physician can testify about an employee’s disability without submitting an expert report. Normally, a witness who is going to provide an expert opinion is required to submit a formal report explaining his or her opinions prior to the trial.

Patricia Del Vecchio worked as police dispatcher for the Township of Bridgewater for approximately a decade. Over the last five years she held that position, her gastroenterologist, Gary Ciambotti, M.D., wrote fourteen doctors’ notes indicating that due to a variety of gastroenterological conditions, including irritable bowel syndrome, Ms. Del Vecchia should not work the night shift unless it was an emergency.

For three years, Bridgewater did not require Ms. Del Vecchio to work the night shift, but eventually it asked her to transfer to the midnight shift. She indicated she did not want to work the midnight shift because of her medical condition. In response, Bridgewater told her that if she did not accept a transfer to another job it would fire her.

A recent decision by the New Jersey District Court addressed important issues regarding retaliation following an employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation and time off under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).

Supermarket CartsIn Boles v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., plaintiff Barry Boles worked for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for approximately ten years. As a result of a medical condition, his physician signed him out of work for approximately five months, which included several extensions of leave. Wal-Mart retroactively approved his FMLA leave (12 weeks), and designated his remaining time off as personal leave. The plaintiff claimed he did not receive documentation regarding how his leave was allocated or indicating he could be fired if he failed to return to work following his FMLA leave. Within three days after Boles returned to work, Wal-Mart terminated him for failure to return to work following his approved leave.

The plaintiff had received a performance warning approximately two weeks prior to taking leave. Shortly thereafter, Wal-Mart claimed that on one occasion prior to his leave he failed to complete certain overnight job responsibilities and to notify his supervisors that he was leaving early.

Mayor Michael Bloomberg recently signed a new law amending the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) to provide additional protections for women who are pregnant or giving birth. Specifically, the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act requires employers with at least four employees or independent contractors working for them to provide reasonable accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions even if the employee is not disabled. A reasonable accommodation is either a modification to the way a job is performed, or a change to a job duty, that permits the employee to perform the essential functions of her job. The new law goes into effect on January 30, 2014.

Under the NYCHRL, an employer can deny a reasonable accommodation if the employee still would not be able to perform the essential functions of her job, or if providing it would impose an undue hardship on its business. The employer has the burden to prove either of these defenses. In determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship, a company can consider (1) the nature of the accommodation and its cost; (2) the financial and personnel resources of the location at which the accommodation would be provided; (3) the financial and other resources of the entire company; or (4) the composition of the company in terms of the workforce, geographic locations and other similar factors.

New Rights for Pregnant Employees In NYC.1.jpgUnder the Act, an employer must provide reasonable accommodations for pregnancy or child birth if it knows or should know the employee is pregnant. This suggests it is not necessary for an employee to request an accommodation for the employer to be obligated to provide one. Of course, the easiest way to ensure your employer knows you need an accommodation is to request it so there is no doubt your employer knows you need it. The same provision raises the question of what would happen if an employer tries to provide an unnecessary or unwanted accommodation. Presumably this should be addressed in a discussion between the employer and the employee (the “interactive process”), but there still could be issues if the employer believes it is legally obligated to provide an accommodation that the employee does not want.

Earlier this month, New York’s highest court ruled that although an employee is not entitled to take an indefinite leave of absence as a reasonable accommodation under the New York Human Rights Law (NYHRL), they might be entitled to do so under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).

In the case, Giuseppe Romanello worked for Intesa Sanpaola S.p.A. (Intesa) for approximately 25 years. He experienced major depression and other medical conditions that prevented him from working. Accordingly, he took a leave of absence under the Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA). After a five-month paid leave of absence, the company’s lawyer sent a letter to Mr. Romanello’s lawyer indicating that his FMLA leave time was about to run out, and asking if he intended to return to work or abandon his job. Mr. Romanello’s lawyer responded that although he had no intention of abandoning his job, Mr. Romanello still was medically unable to work for the company, and needed an “indeterminate” leave of absence. The company fired Mr. Romanello in response.

NYHRL Leave of Absence and Reasonable Accommodation.jpgMr. Romanello then filed a lawsuit claiming his employer discriminated against him because of his disability in violation of the NYHRL and the NYCHRL. Both of those laws prohibit employers from firing an employee because of a disability if the employee can perform his or her job with a reasonable accommodation. Depending on the circumstances, time off can be a reasonable accommodation for a disability.

In both New York and New Jersey, employers are required to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees to allow them to remain employed. A reasonable accommodation is a change or modification to the way your job is performed that allows you to remain employed despite having a disability. However, employers are not required to provide accommodations that would eliminate an “essential function” of the job.

Last month, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that although arriving at work on time is an essential function of most jobs, it is not an essential function of every job. The case, McMillan v. City of New York, was filed by Rodney McMillan. Mr. McMillan has a severe disability, schizophrenia. The medication he takes to treat his condition often makes him drowsy and sluggish. As a result, he is often unable to arrive at work until after 10 am. Nonetheless, he successfully worked as a case manager for the City of New York for almost 25 years.

New York City Employment Law.jpgHowever, New York City eventually disciplined Mr. McMillan because of his repeated lateness. In response, he requested reasonable accommodations including shifting his work hours back an hour, and allowing him to work during his lunch hour to “bank” time to make up for days on which he arrived late. NYC denied his request and eventually suspended him for 30 days without pay. Mr. McMillan then filed a disability discrimination lawsuit claiming NYC suspended him because he is disabled, and failed to accommodate his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the New York State Human Rights Law (NYHLR) and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHLR).

The District Court dismissed Mr. McMillan’s claim. It ruled that arriving at work on time was an essential function of Mr. McMillan’s job. Accordingly, it found NYC was not required to grant the accommodations he requested since they would have eliminated an essential function of his job.

But on appeal the Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling. It explained that although courts should give significant deference to an employer’s determination about which job functions are essential, that is only one factor a court should consider. For example, other relevant factors can include the written job description for the position, how much time the employee spends performing the job function, and the experiences of other past and present employees who have held the same or similar jobs with the employer.

The Second Circuit ruled that although arriving on time is an essential function of most jobs, it is not necessarily an essential function of every job. More specifically, it found unique facts about Mr. McMillan’s job that make it less clear whether arriving on time was an essential function of his job. For example, his department has a flex-time policy that allows employees to arrive at work anytime between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. without being considered late. In addition, NYC permitted Mr. McMillan to arrive after 10:00 a.m. when necessary for more than a decade. Accordingly, the Court ruled that it should be left to a jury to determine whether arriving on time was an essential function of Mr. McMillan’s job.

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