New Jersey Employment Lawyer Blog

New York City Prohibits Discrimination Against Unemployed Job Candidates

April 9, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

New York City recently amended its anti-discrimination law, the New York Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), to prohibit discrimination against individuals who are unemployed. The amendment to the NYCHRL prohibits discrimination with respect to both hiring and the terms and conditions of employment on the basis that the job applicant is unemployed. In other words, it makes it unlawful to refuse to hire an employee because he is unemployed, or to offer him a lower salary or employee benefits because he does not already have a job somewhere else.

There are several important exceptions in the amendment to the NYCHRL. For example, it is still permissible for employers to consider a job candidate’s unemployment status if there is a “substantial job-related reason” for doing so. It also permits employers to choose to hire only internal job candidates, even though doing so would eliminate unemployed job candidates from consideration. In addition, it does not apply to civil service employees, and is not intended to interfere with the rights of any employee under a collective bargaining agreement. Further, it makes it clear that employers can ask job candidates about the circumstances under which they left their previous jobs, and to consider those circumstances when deciding who to hire.

The amendment also prohibits employers and employment agencies from advertising that being employed is a job qualification or requirement. In this respect, the New York City law is similar to a law passed in New Jersey last year (see our previous article: New Jersey Makes it Illegal to Discriminate Against Unemployed Job Candidates). But unlike New Jersey’s law, the NYC law permits employees who have experienced discrimination because of their unemployment status to recover damages including lost past and future wages, emotional distress damages, attorneys’ fees, and potentially punitive damages.

Although Mayor Michael Bloomberg vetoed the law, the New York City Council overrode his veto and enacted it on March 13, 2013. It goes into effect on June 11, 2013.

Arriving on Time is Not an Essential Function of Every Job

April 1, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

In both New York and New Jersey, employers are required to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees to allow them to remain employed. A reasonable accommodation is a change or modification to the way your job is performed that allows you to remain employed despite having a disability. However, employers are not required to provide accommodations that would eliminate an “essential function” of the job.

Last month, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that although arriving at work on time is an essential function of most jobs, it is not an essential function of every job. The case, McMillan v. City of New York, was filed by Rodney McMillan. Mr. McMillan has a severe disability, schizophrenia. The medication he takes to treat his condition often makes him drowsy and sluggish. As a result, he is often unable to arrive at work until after 10 am. Nonetheless, he successfully worked as a case manager for the City of New York for almost 25 years.

However, New York City eventually disciplined Mr. McMillan because of his repeated lateness. In response, he requested reasonable accommodations including shifting his work hours back an hour, and allowing him to work during his lunch hour to “bank” time to make up for days on which he arrived late. NYC denied his request and eventually suspended him for 30 days without pay. Mr. McMillan then filed a disability discrimination lawsuit claiming NYC suspended him because he is disabled, and failed to accommodate his disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the New York State Human Rights Law (NYHLR) and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHLR).

The District Court dismissed Mr. McMillan’s claim. It ruled that arriving at work on time was an essential function of Mr. McMillan’s job. Accordingly, it found NYC was not required to grant the accommodations he requested since they would have eliminated an essential function of his job.

But on appeal the Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling. It explained that although courts should give significant deference to an employer’s determination about which job functions are essential, that is only one factor a court should consider. For example, other relevant factors can include the written job description for the position, how much time the employee spends performing the job function, and the experiences of other past and present employees who have held the same or similar jobs with the employer.

The Second Circuit ruled that although arriving on time is an essential function of most jobs, it is not necessarily an essential function of every job. More specifically, it found unique facts about Mr. McMillan’s job that make it less clear whether arriving on time was an essential function of his job. For example, his department has a flex-time policy that allows employees to arrive at work anytime between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. without being considered late. In addition, NYC permitted Mr. McMillan to arrive after 10:00 a.m. when necessary for more than a decade. Accordingly, the Court ruled that it should be left to a jury to determine whether arriving on time was an essential function of Mr. McMillan’s job.

Public Employees Can Pursue First Amendment Claim if Harmed by Employer’s Discrimination Against Coworker

March 26, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last week, I discussed Montone v. City of Jersey City, a case that ruled Police Sergeant Valerie Montone can proceed with her political affiliation case against the Jersey City Police Department. In the same opinion the Third Circuit ruled that eight other police sergeants can continue with their claim that Jersey City failed to promote them because it was discriminating against Montone.

The other eight Sergeants were on the same promotional list as Montone. None of them were promoted because Jersey City stopped promoting any sergeants to lieutenant, allegedly because Jersey City did not want to promote Montone. In other words, they claim they were collateral damage in Jersey City’s efforts to discriminate against Montone for exercising her First Amendment right to political affiliation.

The Third Circuit ruled that employees can sue for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment even if the retaliation was based on someone else exercising his or her First Amendment rights. It relied on a previous Third Circuit case which recognizes that indirect victims of gender discrimination can sue for discrimination under Title VII if they were treated worse for reasons that “trace back” to unlawful discrimination. In that case, male employees were permitted to pursue a gender discrimination claim in which they claimed their employer refused to hire them from a “priority list” because the company did not want to hire the women on the list. The Third Circuit also relied on a United States Supreme Court opinion recognizing an employee can bring a retaliation claim based on a coworker’s legally protected activity (in that case, retaliation against an employee’s fiancée because the employee filed a claim of gender discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) if the retaliatory action would dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in the protected activity. The Third Circuit explained that without this type of protection, municipal employees might not exercise their rights to express their political beliefs, or might change their political association to avoid retaliation.

Ultimately, the Third Circuit ruled that the eight sergeants can proceed with their civil rights case. It found there is a genuine dispute whether Jersey City failed to promote them because Montone exercised her right of political affiliation. For example, it found disputes regarding whether there really was a shortage of lieutenants in the police department, whether the Police Chief had the authority to make promotions, and why there were no promotions to lieutenant for three years. It therefore concluded that a jury must decide whether Jersey City retaliated against them.

Third Circuit Reinstates Police Sergeant’s Political Affiliation Discrimination Claim Against Jersey City

March 19, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

On March 8, 2013, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Police Sergeant Valerie Montone can proceed with her civil rights case against the City of Jersey City, the Jersey City Police Department, Mayor Jerramiah Healy and retired Jersey City Police Chief Robert Troy. Montone claims she was passed her up for a promotion to lieutenant, in violation of her First Amendment right to political affiliation, because she supported Lou Manzo when he ran against Healy for mayor. She claims they decided not to promote any sergeants for three years so they would not have to promote her.

The First Amendment prohibits the state and local government from discriminating against employees based on which political candidates they support. As the Third Circuit explained, to prove this type of claim an employee has to prove (1) she worked for a public agency in a position that does not require political affiliation, (2) she engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment, and (3) her employer took an adverse action against her, such as firing her, demoting her, or skipping her for a promotion, because of her constitutionally-protected conduct. Montone meets the first two requirements since her job as a sergeant for the Jersey City Police Department does not require any political affiliation, and her efforts supporting Manzo in the mayoral election is protected by the First Amendment. The primary issue on the appeal was whether there was enough evidence for a jury to find the defendants discriminated against her because she supported Mayor Healy’s opponent in the election.

The District Court dismissed Montone’s case, finding there was not enough evidence to prove discrimination. But in Montone v. City of Jersey City the Third Circuit disagreed. It found there was enough evidence for a jury to find discrimination in violation of the First Amendment, including the fact that:

Police Chief Troy made promotions to every other rank, but did not promote a single sergeant to lieutenant;
The number of lieutenants in the police department decreased from 56 to 30 over the three year period;
Jersey City had 66 authorized lieutenant positions, meaning it had 36 vacancies;
Mayor Healy and Chief Troy promoted their political supporters to other positions;
Jersey City has a history of political patronage including hiring employees who supported winning candidates;
Two other sergeants testified that Chief Troy told them they would not be promoted because they were below Montone on the promotion list and the mayor was not going to promote Montone;
The same two sergeants testified that Chief Troy indicated he did not have a problem with them because they did not come out against him during the election; and
Shortly after Chief Troy retired, he met with the new police chief before he decided not to promote Montone. Two days later, Jersey City promoted twelve other sergeants to lieutenant

In the same opinion, the Third Circuit ruled on a related case brought by eight other Jersey City police sergeants who were not promoted during the same three-year period. They claim they were the victims of Jersey City’s retaliation against Montone. I will discuss the fate of their case next week.

Employers Cannot Require Doctor’s Note for Each Use of Intermittent FMLA Leave

March 12, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

The New Jersey Appellate Division recently ruled that an employer violated the Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by requiring an employee to provide a new doctor’s note each time he took time off as part of an intermittent family leave. The FMLA permits a qualified employee to take time off to care for his immediate family member who has a serious health condition. When medically necessary, an employee can take an FMLA leave intermittently, meaning he can take hours or days off when necessary instead of taking the leave all at once.

Ralph West worked as a Corrections Officer for Burlington County. Officer West also was a member of the Policeman’s Benevolent Association (PBA) Local #249 Union. Under its collective bargaining agreement with the PBA, if the County suspects an employee of abusing sick leave it can require him to submit proof of illness. If an employee fails to submit proof within 7 days, the County can require the employee to forfeit his salary during the sick leave and/or discipline him.

Officer West’s son has sickle cell disease. As a result, he sometimes experiences serious health problems including strokes. On March 3, 2010, Officer West requested a family leave under the FMLA to care for his son. The County approved his leave as an intermittent FMLA leave from March 3, 2010 through December 31, 2010.

On May 2, 2010, Officer West’s son woke up jaundiced and in pain. Officer West took the day off to care for his son as part of his intermittent FMLA leave. The next day, his supervisor told him he had to submit proof his son was ill on May 2. Officer West was unable to submit a doctor’s note because he had not taken his son to the doctor, and the doctor was unwilling to write a note because he had not seen his son. As a result, the County docked Officer West’s pay for May 2 and told him he had to submit proof of illness each time he took time off as part of his intermittent family leave. Similarly, the County suspended Officer West for two days when he again called out sick to care for his son on August 15, 2010 without submitting a doctor’s note.

In Police Benevolent Association Local No. 249 v. County of Burlington, the Appellate Division ruled that the County’s policy requiring Officer West to submit a doctor’s note each time he took time off as part of his intermittent family leave violated the FMLA because it interfered with his rights under the FMLA. The Court found this was especially true since there was no evidence Officer West ever abused his intermittent family leave. In doing so, the Court distinguished another case that found a company did not violate the FMLA by requiring employees to call in each day they are out for a medical leave, since it is much easier to call than it is to submit a doctor’s note each time you need to take a day off under the FMLA. In other words, although an employer can impose requirements on employees who take FMLA leaves, those requirements violate the FMLA if they are onerous.

He Said What? Proving Sexual Harassment Based on Information Learned Secondhand

March 7, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

A question that often comes up in sexual harassment cases is whether you can rely on harassment you learned about secondhand to help prove your case. For example, can you use the fact that one of your coworkers told you that someone else made sexually offensive comments about you to help prove you worked in a sexually hostile work environment?

To prove a sexual harassment case, you need to show you experienced conduct because of your gender that was severe (bad) or pervasive (frequent) enough to make a reasonable woman believe the conditions of her employment were altered and her working environment was hostile or abusive. In determining whether your workplace was sufficiently hostile or abusive, a judge or jury is supposed to consider all of the circumstances, including how frequently the discriminatory conduct occurred, how severe it was, whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interfered with your job performance.

There are many cases that recognize an employee can rely on secondhand information in a sexual harassment case for certain purposes. For instance, you can rely on evidence that other women were harassed to help show the treatment you experienced was because of your gender, rather than motivated by something else. That is true even if you did not learn about the harassment the other women experienced until after you left your job.

But can you consider evidence of discriminatory conduct you learned about secondhand to prove your workplace was hostile? Most federal courts that have considered the issue have ruled that as long you were aware of the harassment when you were working for the company, you can use evidence of harassment you learned about from someone else to prove that your work environment was hostile. This includes the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, as well as numerous District Court decisions including the District of New Jersey. As a result, for those of you in New York State, at least assuming your case is in federal court, evidence of harassment you learned about secondhand should be available to help prove your workplace was hostile.

However, there is language in a 2008 New Jersey Supreme Court opinion, Godfrey v. Princeton Theological Seminary, which says that when proving her work environment was hostile, a woman must rely on “evidence of bad conduct of which she has firsthand knowledge.” If interpreted literally, that could mean a plaintiff cannot rely on evidence of harassment she learned about secondhand, even if it actually contributed to make her work environment hostile. But in Godfrey, since the harassment occurred before the employees who brought the lawsuit started working for the employer, it was neither directed at nor witnessed by them. As a result, it is not surprising the court found the women could not rely on this evidence to prove their work environment was hostile.

Given New Jersey’s strong public policy in favor of prohibiting sexual harassment from the workplace, I doubt the New Jersey Supreme Court intended to rule that an employee can never rely on harassment she learned about second hand. Rather, evidence of harassment that you learned about secondhand should be relevant as long as it actually contributed to making your work environment hostile. Of course, that will not prevent employers from arguing that this type of evidence is inadmissible under Godfrey.

For more information about the Godfrey case, please read our previous article: New Jersey Supreme Court Clarifies Sexual Harassment Standard: Repeatedly Asking for Dates is Not Sexual Harassment.

Third Circuit Finds No Evidence of Discrimination Necessary to Prove Discrimination Case

February 28, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last month, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that an employee does not need to have any evidence of discrimination before she can present her case to a jury. The Third Circuit is the federal court that handles appeals from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and the Virgin Islands.

The employee who brought the case, Mary Burton, worked for Teleflex Inc. as a Vice President of New Business Development. On June 3, 2008 she got into a disagreement with her supervisor, Edward Boarini. Mr. Boarini claims Ms. Burton resigned during the meeting. In contrast, Ms. Burton claims she mentioned the possibility of resigning, but did not actually resign. At the time, Ms. Burton was 68 years old.

According to Ms. Burton, she did not report to work the next two days because she was upset about the meeting. She then took a preplanned vacation. On the day she was scheduled to return to work, Teleflex sent her a letter indicating it was accepting her resignation.

After her lawyer unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a severance package, Ms. Burton filed a lawsuit claiming the company’s decision to fire her was age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But the District Court dismissed Ms. Burton’s case. It found she voluntarily resigned, and therefore could not pursue a wrongful termination claim. It also found that even if she did not intend to resign, there was no evidence the company fired her because of her age or gender, rather than because it believed she had resigned.

But on appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. It found that since there is a factual dispute whether Ms. Burton actually resigned, a jury needs to decide whose version of the events is true. It explained that a jury can conclude Ms. Burton was fired based on her testimony that she never said she was resigning, as well as the fact that she never tendered a resignation letter, never told anyone she was resigning, and the company merely took Mr. Boarini’s word that she had resigned without confirming it with her.

The Third Circuit further ruled that a jury can find Teleflex’s decision to fire Ms. Burton because of her age or gender even though there is no evidence of discrimination. It explained that one way an employee can prove her case is by pointing out “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in the employer’s explanation for terminating her. In essence, it ruled that a jury can find Teleflex lied when it claimed it believed Ms. Burton had resigned, and can conclude the reason the company lied was to cover up age or gender discrimination. The Third Circuit’s opinion in Burton v. Teleflex Inc. is published, meaning it is a binding legal precedent.

Department of Labor Explains FMLA Leaves to Care for Adult Children

February 19, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last month, the United States Department of Labor (DOL) clarified when a qualified employee can take a leave under the Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to care for an adult child. As the Interpretation explains, the FMLA permits eligible employees to take up to 12 weeks off from work to care for a son or daughter who has a serious health condition. The FMLA defines a “son or daughter” to include a biological, adopted, or foster child, as well as a stepchild or legal ward. It applies to all children who are under 18 years old. It also applies to children who are at least 18 years old, but only if the child (1) has a disability; (2) is incapable of caring for him or herself due to the disability; (3) has a serious health condition; and (4) needs a parent to care for him because of the serious health condition.

1. The Adult Child Has a Disability

The DOL explained that the first requirement for qualified employees to take an FMLA leave to care for their adult child is the child must have a disability as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Fortunately, the FMLA adopts the ADA’s relatively new and much broader definition under the Americans with Disabilities Amendment Act (ADAAA). That definition includes any physical or mental condition that substantially impairs a major life activity. Major life activities include the ability to care for yourself, perform manual tasks, see, hear, eat, sleep, walk, stand, lift, bend, speak, breath, learn, read, concentrate, think, communicate, or work. As long as it substantially limits a major life activity, a disability can include a pregnancy-related condition or a condition that is episodic or in remission.

2. The Adult Child is Incapable of Self-Care

The second requirement for the FMLA to cover an adult child is the child must be unable to care for him or herself due to the disability. As the DOL explained, this means the son or daughter needs daily assistance or supervision to care for at least three “activities of daily living” or “instrumental activities of daily living.” Activities of daily living include grooming and hygiene, bathing, dressing, and eating. Instrumental activities of daily living include cooking, cleaning, shopping, taking public transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, using telephones, or using the post office.

3. The Adult Child Has a Serious Health Condition

The third requirement is that the adult son or daughter has a serious health condition. This means the adult child must have an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves either inpatient care or continuing treatment by a health care provider. As the DOL’s Interpretation recognizes, although the FMLA’s definition of a serious health condition is different from the ADA’s definition of a disability, many conditions are both a serious health condition and a disability.
4. The Parent Needs to Care for the Adult Child Due to the Serious Health Condition

The final requirement for a qualified employee to be entitled to an FMLA leave to care for an adult child is the adult child must need the parent’s care because of the serious health condition. This includes situations in which the parent needs to care for an adult son or daughter who is “unable to care for his or her own basic medical, hygienic, or nutritional needs or safety, or is unable to transport himself or herself to the doctor” due to a serious health condition. It also includes situations in which a parent needs to provide psychological comfort or reassurance to an adult child who has a serious health condition while receiving inpatient or home care.

It Happened to Me Too – When Can You Prove Harassment With Evidence of Harassment to Someone Else?

February 11, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last week, I discussed Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp., a case which recognizes that an employee who sent sexual emails at work still can pursue a sexual harassment claim. Mandel also addresses when an employee can use evidence that someone else experienced harassment to prove her own harassment claim. In other words, it discusses when an employee can offer so-called “me too” evidence in a harassment case.

Mandel recognizes that whether you can use evidence that someone else experienced sexual harassment to try to prove your own case depends on the circumstances. The most important factor is how related or similar the two forms of harassment are to each other. A previous United States Supreme Court case, Spring/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, recognizes that depending on the circumstances, “me too” evidence can be used to prove a discrimination or harassment case even if the harassment involved a different supervisor.

Applying this principle in Mandel, the Third Circuit ruled that the lower court correctly prohibited Ms. Mandel from relying on evidence of harassment toward two other women. It explained that while Ms. Mandel worked for a subsidiary, M&Q Packaging, the other two women worked for its parent company, M&Q Plastic Products, Inc. As a result, the Third Circuit found the harassment the other women experienced was not similar enough to the harassment Ms. Mandel alleged she experience. It therefore ruled that Ms. Mandel cannot use evidence regarding the sexual harassment the other two women experienced to support her own claim.

In other instances, an employee might be able to use evidence that another supervisor harassed someone else at work to prove her claim. Relevant factors are likely to include things like how similar the acts of harassment are to each other, whether the harassment occurred in the same department or building, whether the harassers reported to the same supervisor, how close in time the harassment occurred to each other, and other similarities and differences between the acts of harassment.

Employee Who Sent Sexual Emails at Work Still Can Pursue a Sexual Harassment Claim

February 4, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

When an employee brings a harassment claim under federal law, one element of her claim is that she was harmed by the harassment. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently recognized that an employee can meet that requirement even though she personally sent emails containing sexual jokes at work.

The employee in question, Shannon Mandel, worked for M&Q Packing Corp. as an Inside Sales and Customer Relations Coordinator. She alleges she experienced sexual harassment including:

Calling her “woman,” “darling,” “fluffy,” “missy,” “hon,” “toots,” “too female;” and “too emotional;”
Commenting about her body, clothing, and physical appearance;
Paying her less than her male peer;
A male manager telling her a meeting would take place at his house, and they would conclude their part of the meeting in the morning;
Another male supervisor indicting he fantasizes about her while having sex with his wife; and
A third male manager asking her on dates even after she told him she was not interested

Ms. Mandel resigned shortly after a fourth male manager called her a “bitch.”

Previously, the District Court had dismissed Ms. Mandel’s sexual harassment claim, finding there was not enough evidence for a jury to conclude she was harmed by the harassment. It relied heavily on the fact that Ms. Mandel frequently used vulgarity and sent emails containing sexual jokes at work. The District Court found this behavior demonstrated Ms. Mandel’s “casual ease with this type of workplace behavior.” While the court recognized that did not necessarily mean Ms. Mandel had not been harmed by the harassment she experienced, it also concluded she had no evidence she had experienced emotional distress as a result of the harassment, or that the harassment made it more difficult for her to perform her job. It also indicated the only time Ms. Mandel complained about the harassment was after she was called a “bitch,” and she made that complaint to a coworker rather than to a supervisor or the Human Resources Department.

In Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp., the Third Circuit strongly disagreed. It indicated it was “disturbed” by the District Court’s conclusion that no reasonable jury could find Ms. Mandel was harmed by the harassment. It explained that even though Ms. Mandel engaged in unprofessional conduct by using vulgarity and sending sexual jokes, the harassment she experienced was “often worse and apparently uninvited.” Further, it disputed the District Court’s conclusion that Ms. Mandel only complained about one incident of harassment. In addition, it recognized that Ms. Mandel had stated under oath that the harassment caused her harm. Accordingly, it found a reasonable jury could conclude that Ms. Mandel was harmed by the sexual harassment, and reversed the District Court’s decision to dismiss her sexual harassment claim.