New Jersey Employment Lawyer Blog

Court Rules New Jersey Law Against Discrimination Does Not Apply to New Jersey Resident Who Worked in Pennsylvania

January 28, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

A federal judge in New Jersey recently dismissed an employee’s discrimination lawsuit on the basis that the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) does not apply to New Jersey residents who work outside of New Jersey. The employee, Blaise A. McGovern, is a resident of New Jersey. He worked for Southwest Airlines as a ramp supervisor at Philadelphia International Airport. He claims Southwest subjected him to abusive, harassing, and homophobic conduct. After Mr. McGovern reported the harassment to his supervisors, he received harassing telephone calls and text messages. After he filed a written harassment complaint, Southwest Airlines fired him.

Mr. McGovern sued Southwest under the NJLAD, alleging harassment and wrongful termination. Although the judge’s opinion in McGovern v. Southwest Airlines does not say it, Mr. McGovern presumably claimed Southwest engaged in sexual orientation discrimination.

Southwest asked the court to dismiss Mr. McGovern’s case. It argued that the NJLAD does not apply because Mr. McGovern worked for it exclusively in Pennsylvania. In response, Mr. McGovern argued that even though he did not perform any work for Southwest in New Jersey, the NJLAD still applies since some of the harassment occurred in New Jersey. For example, he received many of the harassing telephone calls and text messages while he was at home in New Jersey.

In granting Southwester’s motion to dismiss the case, the judge explained that under New Jersey law a judge normally has to apply the employment laws of the state where the employee worked. He explained this rule protects companies from the “potential unfairness of having to comply with several different” sets of employment laws simply because their employees happen to live in different states. However, the judge noted there are exceptions to this general rule for employees who have “non-trivial” job duties in New Jersey. However, merely performing a small portion of your work in New Jersey is not enough for the NJLAD to apply. Since Mr. McGovern had not performed any work for Southwest in New Jersey, the judge rule that the NJLAD does not apply to him.

As discussed in a previous article, New York has a very different rule to determine whether the New York Human Rights Law (NYHRL) applies to an employee who works outside of New York. Specifically, the NYHRL applies to employees who live in New York or when discrimination had an impact in New York even if the employee never worked in New York. As a result, the NYHRL applies to a much broader group of employees than the NJLAD.

Court Upholds Newark Police Officer’s $700,000 Verdict in Retaliation Case

January 21, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed a Newark police officer’s $700,000 verdict in a wrongful termination case. The case was brought by Jose Montalvo, who was a police officer for the City of Newark from 1990 to 2006. On April 22, 2005, he filed an affirmative action complaint, claiming the police department started harassing him after he fired his weapon at a citizen in 2000. For example, despite Mr. Montalvo’s repeated requests, the department refused to return his fire arm, and instead kept him assigned to cell block duty for longer than it had assigned anyone else to it. According to testimony, Newark assigns police officers to the cell block as a form of punishment.

At the trial, Mr. Montalvo presented evidence that Newark began further harassing him after he filed his affirmative action complaint. For instance, the police department suspended him for 21 days relating to the shooting, even though it occurred five years earlier. Ultimately, Newark fired Mr. Montalvo for making false statements during a police department investigation and disclosing confidential information about the investigation. However, Mr. Montalvo presented evidence at the trial showing the department gave less severe discipline to other police officers who were brought up on similar disciplinary charges.

At the trial, the jury found Newark fired Mr. Montalvo in retaliation for filing his affirmative action complaint, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), and awarded him $700,000. The LAD prohibits employers from retaliating against an employee because he complained about workplace discrimination.

Newark appealed, arguing there was not enough evidence to connect its decision to fire Mr. Montalvo to his affirmative action complaint. However, the Third Circuit rejected this argument. In Montalvo v. City of Newark, it ruled the jury’s find that Newark fired Mr. Montalvo in retaliation for his affirmative action complaint was supported by the pattern of Newark antagonizing him after he filed it.

On appeal, Newark also asked the court to overturn the verdict on the basis that the Police Chief who made the decision to fire Mr. Montalvo testified that he did not even know about Mr. Montalvo’s affirmative action complaint. However, the court concluded that the jury was not required to believe the Police Chief’s testimony. It also explained that, even if the Chief did not know about Mr. Montalvo’s affirmative action complaint, his decision to fire Mr. Montalvo still could have been retaliatory since there was evidence he relied on a “tainted” retaliatory performance evaluation prepared by another employee who did know about his complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed Mr. Montalvo’s $700,000 verdict.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) About Severance Agreements

January 13, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Some of the most common questions employees ask employment lawyers relate to severance pay. Below, we have answered a few of the most frequently asked questions about severance agreements under New York and New Jersey law.

Q: I have been laid off or fired by my company. Am I entitled to severance?

A: Generally, in New York and New Jersey there is generally no legal requirement for a company to pay severance to its employees. However, if your company has a severance policy or plan, then it has to pay you severance if you meet the relevant eligibility requirements. Likewise, if you have an individual employment contract, then your employer is required to pay you any severance you are entitled to under your contract.

New Jersey Court Reverses Million Dollar Award in Disability Discrimination Case, Finding Jury Relied on Inadmissible Hearsay

January 7, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last month, New Jersey’s Appellate Division reversed a verdict of over one million dollars in a disability discrimination and retaliation case because the only evidence supporting the claim was inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is basically when you try to prove something is true based on the fact that someone else said it was true outside of the courtroom. Hearsay generally is not admissible at a trial because it is considered untrustworthy. However, there are many exceptions to that rule.

The case was brought by Anthony Pace, who was a security guard for the Elizabeth Board of Education for more than 15 years. In 2003, Mr. Pace suffered a knee injury at work, and filed a worker’s compensation claim. In 2006, the Board decided not to renew Mr. Pace’s contract as part of a reduction-in-force. Mr. Pace then sued, claiming the Board’s decision to lay him off was both disability discrimination and an act of retaliation because he filed a workers’ compensation claim. A jury agreed with Mr. Pace and awarded him $147,630 for past lost wages, $427,370 for future lost wages, and $250,000 in punitive damages. He also was awarded $237,843 in attorney’s fees and $7,708.84 to reimburse him for his litigation costs, bringing his total judgment to more than a million dollars.

The primary evidence to support Mr. Pace’s claims were two witnesses who testified that a former member of the Board, Carol Cascio, told them the Board was trying to eliminate employees who had brought worker’s compensation claims against it during the reduction-in-force. Both of the witnesses indicated that Ms. Cascio made those statements after she had left the Board.

However, in Pace v. Elizabeth Board of Education, the Appellate Division ruled that this evidence was inadmissible hearsay. In doing so, the court rejected numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule. For example, it found an exception for statements made by the opposing party did not apply since Mr. Pace did not sue Ms. Cascio personally so she could not be an opposing party. Similarly, it found an exception for statements by agents, employees and representatives of an opposing party did not apply because Ms. Cascio was no longer an employee of the Board when she allegedly made the statements. It also rejected an exception for statements that are against the speaker’s interests because Ms. Cascio did not say anything that personally implicated herself in any wrongdoing. Likewise, it rejected other exceptions to the hearsay rule because there was no evidence the Board had authorized Ms. Cascio’s statement, and no evidence it adopted her statement as its own. Ultimately, having found the only evidence of discrimination and retaliation was inadmissible hearsay, the Appellate Division overturned the jury’s verdict.

New York’s Highest Court Refuses to Expand Exception to Employment At-Will

December 28, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Earlier this year, New York’s Court of Appeals dismissed a wrongful termination lawsuit brought by a Compliance Officer who objected about an unethical stock transaction by the company’s President and Chief Executive Officer. In doing so, New York’s highest court refused to extend an exception to the employment at-will doctrine. Employment at-will is the general rule that a company can fire an employee for any reason, or even for no reason at all. Although there are many exceptions to employment at-will, such as anti-discrimination laws, New York does not have a whistleblower law that would have protected this employee.

Specifically, in Sullivan v. William F. Harnisch, Joseph Sullivan was a partner in two related hedge fund companies, Peconic Partners LLC and Peconic Asset Managers LLC. He also held several other job titles, including Executive Vice President, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Compliance Officer. Mr. Sullivan objected about apparent improper and unethical stock sales by the company’s Chief Executive Officer and President, William Harnisch. Peconic fired Mr. Sullivan within days after he made this complaint. He then sued, claiming Peconic’s decision to fire him was retaliation in violation of the company’s Code of Ethics.

In an earlier case, Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., the New York Court of Appeals found an exception to employment at-will for a lawyer who objected about accounting improprieties at his law firm. The Court allowed the attorney to proceed with his wrongful discharge case. It found there is an implied agreement between attorneys and their law firms that they will each follow professional ethical standards, and that American home Products violated that agreement when it fired Mr. Murphy.

However, in Sullivan the Court of Appeals refused to expand that rule to protect Mr. Sullivan. It indicated that although Murphy is not necessarily limited to the relationship between lawyers and law firms, there needs to be a uniquely close connection between the employment relationship and an ethical obligation that makes the two “incapable of separation.” It found no such relationship between a Compliance Officer and the hedge fund for which he works. It also found there is nothing express or implied in Peconic’s Code of Conduct that prohibits the company from firing an employee for reporting an unethical stock transaction. Accordingly, it found Mr. Sullivan did not have a legal claim, and dismissed his case

Decision to Seek Outside Job Candidate Isn’t Legitimate Reason Not to Promote Employee

December 22, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last week I discussed Colicchio v. Merck & Co., Inc., a case involving an employee who claims her employer Justified Eliminating Her Job by Reducing Her Job Duties After Her Maternity Leave. The employee in that case, Kerri Colicchio, also claims her employer failed to promote her because of her gender and pregnancy, and retaliated against her for objecting to violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD).

The judge allowed Ms. Colicchio to proceed with her claim that the company failed to promote her to the position of Vice President of Global OE. Ms. Colicchio testified that her supervisor told her she was not being considered for that position on an interim basis expressly because she was about to go out on a maternity leave. The judge found this was not “smoking gun” evidence since the comment involved the interim position, and Ms. Colicchio was suing Merck for failing to offer her the job on a permanent basis. However, he found the comment showed the company used Ms. Colicchio’s pregnancy as an important negative factor in making employment decisions about her. In other words, it was evidence of pregnancy discrimination.

The judge also found Merck’s justification for its decision not to promote Ms. Colicchio was not a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Specifically, Merck claims it decided to consider only external job candidates for the position. The judge called this explanation “barely more than no reason at all,” since the company did not indicate why it decided not to consider internal candidates. This is noteworthy, since it potentially means Merck does not have a valid defense to Ms. Colicchio’s claim that it failed to promote her because of her gender and pregnancy.

However, the court dismissed Ms. Colicchio’s retaliation claim. It explained that to be protected by the LAD, an objection has to either expressly or implicitly indicate that the company treated an employee differently based on a legally protected category. For example, an employee who objects to race, age, or gender discrimination would be legally protected from retaliation under the LAD. However, when Ms. Colicchio made her internal complaints, she only indicated she was being treated unfairly, without stating or implying she believe the unfair treatment was due to her gender or pregnancy. As a result, the Judge ruled that Ms. Colicchio does not have a valid retaliation claim.

Employee Claims Company Justified Eliminating Her Job by Reducing Her Job Duties After Her Maternity Leave

December 15, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

A New Jersey judge recently issued a noteworthy decision in a gender and pregnancy discrimination case, Colicchio v. Merck & Co., Inc. The fact scenario is fairly common. Kerri Colicchio worked for Merck & Co., Inc. for approximately a decade. She alleges the company passed her over for a promotion shortly before she was scheduled to go on a maternity leave. She also claims the company took away many of her job duties when she returned from that leave, and eventually used her reduced role as a justification to fire her as part of a “business reorganization.”

Merck asked the judge to dismiss her gender discrimination and pregnancy discrimination claims. It argued that since there was nearly a year between Ms. Colicchio’s maternity leave and the elimination of her position, she could not prove the company discriminated against her. The judge was not persuaded. He found Ms. Colicchio offered evidence that her supervisors made discriminatory statements right before her pregnancy leave, decided to fire her while she on that leave, and then carried out its decision by gradually taking away her job duties when she returned to work so it ultimately could justify eliminating her position.

Ms. Colicchio’s evidence of discrimination includes the fact that her boss told her she would have been promoted to the position of Interim Vice President of Global OE if she had not been scheduled to take a maternity leave. The judge recognized this was evidence the company was using her maternity leave as a negative factor in employment decisions. Ms. Colicchio also testified that her boss tried to discourage her from returning to work by telling her “babies need their mamas.” The court found this was further evidence of Merck’s discriminatory motive. The judge concluded that the evidence supports the conclusion that Merck removed Ms. Colicchio’s job duties as part of a plan to set her up to be fired.

The judge also allowed Ms. Colicchio to proceed to a trial on her claim that Merck interfered with her right to take a leave under the Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the New Jersey Family Leave Act (FLA). Specifically, he recognized that a jury could find the company denied her the right to return to her position, or an equivalent one, based on the evidence that Merck reduced her job duties after she returned from her maternity leave.

New Jersey Court Permits Age Discrimination Lawsuit Because Company Retained Younger Employees

December 9, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last month, a federal judge in New Jersey allowed a group of employees to proceed with their class action age discrimination lawsuit even though they do not claim the company hired younger employees to replace them.

In Bratek v. TD Bank, NA, four customer service representatives, Edna Bratek, Diane Deluca, Lois Skoff, and David Steinberg, claim TD Bank fired them because of their age. They were each over 60 years old when TD Bank included them in a reduction in force. They sued, claiming the company targeted older employees, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.

TD Bank moved to dismiss the case, claiming the employees did not set forth facts which, if true, would prove age discrimination. In particular, they argued that the lawsuit does not even allege the Bank hired younger customer service representatives to replace the older employees it fired. The Court agreed that the employees did not claim the Bank had replaced them with younger employees, but it found they could proceed with their case on another theory. It recognized that an employee can set forth a claim of discrimination in a case involving a reduction-in-force by alleging the company retained one or more younger employees to perform his job. Thus, for example, an employee can claim the company gave his job duties to younger employees who it chose not to lay off.

TD Bank also argued that even though the lawsuit named 18 customer service employees under 40 years old who the company retained after the reduction-in-force that was a small fraction of the customer service employees it retained, is statistically meaningless, and is not enough to support an inference of age discrimination. The company claimed this was particularly true since the lawsuit is a class action filed on behalf of hundreds (and potentially as many as a thousand) older customer service representatives who lost their jobs in the reduction-in-force.

The district judge rejected this argument. He recognized it would be extremely difficult for an employee filing a class action discrimination lawsuit to list the names and ages of a large percentage of the employees who the company retained. It also recognized that a lawsuit only needs to set forth facts that are compatible with discrimination to support an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, he concluded that providing the names and ages of several younger customer service representatives who the Bank retained was enough for the employees to proceed with their case.

United States Supreme Court Rules Arbitrator Must Decide Whether Non-Compete Agreement is Enforceable

December 4, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last week, the United States Supreme Court overturned a state court’s ruling that a non-compete agreement is invalid because it violates state law. The Supreme Court ruled that since the non-competition agreement included a valid arbitration clause, an arbitrator has to decide whether the non-compete agreement is legally enforceable.

The case originated in Oklahoma, a state which has a statute that limits when non-competition agreements are enforceable. Eddie Lee Howard and Shane D. Schneider filed a lawsuit against their former employer, Nitro-Lift Technologies, in which they sought a ruling that the confidentiality and non-compete agreements they entered into with Nitro-Lift were unenforceable because they violated Oklahoma law. The case went up to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which ruled that the non-compete agreements were null and void under Oklahoma law. However, Nitro-Lift argued that the state Supreme Court should not have decided whether the non-compete agreement was enforceable since there were provisions in the non-compete agreements which required all disputes to be decided through private arbitration.

The United States Supreme Court agreed with Nitro-Lift. In Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard, it ruled that once a court determines there is a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement, decisions about the enforceability of anything else in the contract must be decided by an arbitrator. As a result, the Oklahoma Supreme Court should not have decided whether the non-compete agreement itself is enforceable.

Nitro-Lift is part of a series of cases in which the United States Supreme Court has recognized how difficult it is to get around arbitration agreements. This is extremely important, since when you sign an arbitration agreement you are giving up your right to a jury trial, and arbitration is typically considered much more favorable to employers than employees.

Reducing Employee Hours in Response to Overtime Lawsuit Can Be Retaliatory

November 21, 2012 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

New Jersey’s Appellate Division recently recognized it can be unlawful for a company to reduce employees’ overtime hours in response to an overtime lawsuit. Specifically, the case finds that such a policy could violate New Jersey’s whistleblower law, the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA).

Howard Flecker III worked as a Deckhand for Statue Cruises, a company which provides ferry service from New York and New Jersey to Liberty Island and Ellis Island.Under the company’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), employees were entitled to be paid time-and-a-half only after they worked more than 48 hours per week. The FLSA is a federal law which requires companies to pay “non-exempt” employees overtime pay at the rate of time-and-a-half when they work more than 40 hours per week
In 2009, Mr. Flecker filed a class action lawsuit claiming the CBA violates the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In direct response to Mr. Flecker’s lawsuit, the company issued a memorandum indicating that none of its employees would work 40 hours per week. For example, the company reduced Mr. Flecker from 50 to 40 hours per week.

As a result, Mr. Flecker’s coworkers lost 8 or more hours of pay per week. Many of his coworkers confronted him about this on a daily basis, and pressured him to withdraw his lawsuit. Mr. Flecker’s lawyer told the company that its policy was a form of unlawful retaliation in violation of CEPA. The company responded that it was attempting to minimize the potential damages in Mr. Flecker’s overtime lawsuit. Eventually, due to the stress caused by his co-workers’ constant pressure to withdraw his lawsuit, he resigned. He also added a retaliation claim to his lawsuit under CEPA.

The trial court dismissed Mr. Flecker’s CEPA claim, finding he had not alleged any retaliatory action. However, in Flecker v. Statue Cruises, LLC , the Appellate Division disagreed, and found two potential retaliatory actions. First, it ruled a jury could conclude the company’s actions were intended to turn Mr. Flecker’s co-workers on him, which in turn forced him to resign. In other words, a jury could conclude the company constructively discharged him. Second, it found reducing Mr. Flecker’s hours because he filed an overtime lawsuit could violate CEPA if the company’s motive was to retaliate against him for filing his lawsuit. The court explained this theory was supported by the fact that, although the company claimed it was going to reduce the hours of all of its employees, it did not reduce the hours of at least two of the employees who had been harassing Mr. Flecker.