Discrimination

Inability to Sit for Long Time Can Be Disability Under Americans with Disabilities Act

April 9, 2014 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal law that prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because they are disabled. It defines a “disability” as a physical or psychological impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. As a result, not every impairment is a disability. In contrast, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), the New York Human Rights Law (NYHRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) all have significantly broader definitions of the term “disability” including relatively minor mental and physical impairments.

Late last month, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that an impairment that prohibits an employee for sitting for too long can be a disability even under the ADA. The employee, Carmen Parada, worked for Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A. Approximately six months after she started working for the bank, Ms. Parada fell and hurt her back. As a result, she no longer is able to sit for a prolonged period. According to one of her medical reports, she is able to sit for only 15 minutes before she has to stand.

Ms. Parada asked the bank for an ergonomic chair which she believed would have allowed her to perform her job. The bank did not respond to her requests so she asked again, this time offering to pay for the chair herself. When she still did not receive any response she told the bank she could not continue to perform her job without a new chair. When the bank’s Operations Manager finally told Ms. Parada he would discuss her request when he returned from a business trip she complained to the Compliance Officer and requested a leave of absence. Ultimately, the bank fired Ms. Parada, claiming she failed to provide sufficient documentation to prove she was disabled and needed a medical leave, and declaring it considered her to have abandoned her job.

New Jersey Passes Law Prohibiting Pregnancy Discrimination

January 22, 2014 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Yesterday, Governor Christie signed a law that prohibits pregnancy discrimination in New Jersey. The Act, which is an amendment to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”), adds pregnancy to the list of legally protected categories. Importantly, it defines “pregnancy” broadly to include not only pregnancy itself but also childbirth, medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth, and recovery from childbirth.

The new law is expressly premised on the fact that “pregnant women are vulnerable to discrimination in the workplace in New Jersey.” It notes that “women who request an accommodation that will allow them to maintain a healthy pregnancy, or who need a reasonable accommodation while recovering from childbirth, are being removed from their positions, placed on unpaid leave, or fired.” Its goal is to eliminate those forms of discrimination from the workplace.

In the past, many court opinions have found pregnancy discrimination to be a form of unlawful gender discrimination. However, not every court has agreed, leaving some uncertainty in the law. This new law removes any doubt that it is unlawful for an employer to treat a woman worse because of her pregnancy or childbirth, and makes it clear that employers cannot treat pregnant women less favorably than their similarly situated coworkers.

Proving Age Discrimination When You Are Replaced by Someone Only Slightly Younger

January 21, 2014 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Age discrimination occurs frequently but often is subtle. You may be certain you were fired because of your age, but not have any direct proof or “smoking gun” evidence. Fortunately, that does not necessarily mean you cannot prove your claim.

Employees who want to prove they were fired because of their age frequently try to show their employers replaced them with someone significantly younger. However, as a recent case demonstrates, this is not difficult to do and is not necessarily required.

Marion Cohen worked for the University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ) as an associate professor of anatomy and cell biology and injury sciences pursuant to a series of one, two and three-year employment contracts. In late 2008 or early 2009 UMDNJ informed her it was not going to renew her contract, supposedly due to budget cuts. At the time, Ms. Cohen was 69 years old.

Prosecuted for Trying to Prove Discrimination?

December 31, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last week, New Jersey’s Appellate Division refused to dismiss a criminal indictment against an employee who took documents from her employer in an attempt to support her employment discrimination claims. While it is a criminal case, it undoubtedly has implications for employment lawyers and individuals with employment law claims.

Ivonne Saavedra worked for the North Bergen Board of Education in Hudson County, New Jersey. She is being prosecuted for taking 367 documents from her employer, including 69 original documents. According to the prosecutor, many of those documents are “highly confidential” and contain “very sensitive” information. A grand jury indicted Ms. Saavedra for second-degree official misconduct and third-degree theft.

According to Ms. Saavedra, she took the documents to help prove she was a victim of gender and ethnic discrimination at her job. She is arguing she had the legal right to take the documents based on a previous New Jersey Supreme Court case, Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. Quinlan establishes a balancing test to determine if an employee is protected from retaliation when she takes documents from her employer to help prove an employment discrimination case. I discussed Quinlan in a previous article, Can You Be Fired For Giving Confidential Company Documents to Your Employment Lawyer?

New Jersey Court Permits Employee to Proceed with Disability Discrimination Lawsuit

December 26, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Earlier this month, a federal judge in New Jersey ruled that Bryan Maher can proceed with numerous employment law claims against his former employer, Abbott Laboratories.

Mr. Maher began working for Abbott in June 2008 as a Senior Distribution Specialist. In 2009, his sales numbers declined. By June the company began requiring him to participate in weekly one-on-one telephone coaching sessions. It also received several complaints from Mr. Maher’s customers. By late August 2009, the company placed Mr. Maher on an informal coaching plan and warned him he could be fired if his sales did not improve.

In October 2009, Mr. Maher was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation (an irregular heartbeat) which was exacerbated by workplace stress. The company granted his request to take four days off from work for testing.

Governor Christie Signs Two New Employment Laws

September 16, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

On August 30, 2013, Governor Christopher Christie signed two new employment laws. The first law expands the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) to protect employees who are trying to obtain information to support a potential claim of pay discrimination. The second new law prohibits employers from asking employees or job candidates to provide their private social media information to the company.

Whistleblower Protection for Employees Providing Information About Pay Discrimination

The first new law amends the LAD to prohibit employers from retaliating against employees because they ask a current or former co-worker about an employee’s “job title, occupational category, and rate of compensation, including benefits.” It also protects employees who ask about another’s employee’s “gender, race, ethnicity, military status, or national origin.” These new whistleblower protections apply only if the information or question is intended to help with an investigation of potential discrimination regarding “pay, compensation, bonuses, other compensation, or benefits.” However, the statute makes it clear it is not intended to require anyone to disclose this information about him or herself or another employee. This amendment to the LAD went into effect immediately.

Employers Can Be Held Liable For Discrimination Even if Decision-Maker Has No Bias

August 1, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

New Jersey’s Appellate Division recently recognized that a company cannot escape liability for discrimination by having someone else make the final termination decision. The case was filed by Tina Shipe, an employee who worked for several different Shop Rite supermarkets over 17 years. Ms. Shipe was the only female meat cutter who worked for her employer, Saker Shoprites, Inc.

In January 2008, Saker fired Ms. Shipe. Saker claims Ms. Shipe became extremely angry and cursed loudly enough that other employees and customers could hear her after her department manager, Chris Antimary, accused her of violating several store policies. Based on information he received from Mr. Antimary, the company’s senior vice president of human resources, Kevin Maroney, made the decision to fire Ms. Shipe.

In contrast, Ms. Shipe testified that Mr. Antimary treated her poorly from the first day she began working in his store. Mr. Antimary then falsely accused her of violating several store policies in an attempt to set her up to be fired. Ms. Shipe claims that although she was upset by the false accusations, she never cursed or raised her voice. Rather, Mr. Antimary confronted her, demanded that she admit she violated the store’s policies and got in her face in a way suggesting he wanted to fight her. Ms. Shipe was extremely upset by his behavior, and as a result stayed in the store bathroom for approximately 10 minutes while she composed herself and tried to stop crying.

Ms. Shipe sued, alleging gender discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). At her trial, the jury found in her favor and awarded her $198,894 in past economic losses (back pay), $486,200 in future economic losses (front pay) and $145,860 in emotional distress damages. The judge subsequently awarded her more than $67,000 in attorney’s fees and costs.

The employer appealed, asking the Appellate Division to reverse the jury’s verdict. It argued there was not enough evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that it fired Ms. Saker because she is a woman, rather than because she was insubordinate after Mr. Antimary disciplined her. However, in Shipe v. Saker Shoprites, Inc. the court found there was enough evidence for the jury to conclude the meeting was a set-up to falsely discipline Ms. Shipe because of her gender, and that her testimony was enough to dispute the company’s claim it fired her for supposedly using profanity after the meeting.

Saker also argued there was no evidence that Kevin Maroney, the Vice President of Human Resources who made the decision to fire Ms. Shipe, had any discriminatory bias. In fact, Ms. Shipe did not even claim he discriminated against her.

However, the Appellate Division rejected this argument because Mr. Maroney relied on the information he received from Mr. Antimary, and the jury found that information was discriminatory. The court explained that if this was not legally actionable, companies could avoid responsibility for discrimination by having someone who does not know the employee make final termination (and other disciplinary) decisions based on discriminatory information. The court therefore concluded that although there was no evidence Mr. Maroney discriminated against Ms. Shipe, there was enough evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Saker fired her because she is a woman.

Unfortunately, that is not the end of the story. Next week I will discuss the reason why the Appellate Division still reversed Ms. Shipe’s jury verdict, and why I think it was a mistake for it to have done so.

Is Obesity a Disability Under New Jersey and New York Anti-Discrimination Laws?

July 16, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last month the American Medical Association (AMA) voted to designate obesity as a disease. More specifically, it adopted a resolution which states that obesity is a disease that leads to other conditions such as Type 2 diabetes and cardiovascular disease. As a result of the AMA’s decision, it is likely that more employees who are fired, demoted, harassed, or otherwise treated worse at their jobs because they are overweight will be legally protected by both New Jersey and New York law.

Both the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) and the New York Human Rights Law (NYHRL) prohibit employers from discriminating against employees on the basis that they are disabled. The two laws define the term “disability” broadly to include both physical and mental disabilities. Neither statute limits its definition to severe or permanent medical conditions. In particular, the LAD defines disability to include any “physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy and other seizure disorders.” Similarly, the NYHRL’s definition to mean a physical or medical impairment “resulting from anatomical, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.”

Over a decade ago, in Viscik v. Fowler Equipment Co., the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that an employee’s obesity can be a disability under the LAD, but only if it is “morbid.” Obesity is considered “morbid” if it prevents you from engaging in normal activities. In Viscik, the Court found the employee who filed the lawsuit was disabled because her obesity caused her other medical conditions including arthritis, a heart condition, obstructive lung disease and knee problems that limited her ability to walk. The court concluded this met the LAD’s definition of a disability.

Likewise, in Delta Air Lines v. New York State Division of Human Rights, a 1997 case, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that simply being overweight is not a disability under the NYHRL. However, it distinguished another case in which the company’s doctor concluded the employee was unable to perform her job because she was “grossly obese,” a diagnosed medical condition that impaired her ability to work. Thus, like the New Jersey Supreme Court, in the past New York’s highest court required an individual’s obesity to cause an illness, impairment or limitation before it can be considered a disability under the NYHRL.

But at least arguably, today the analysis could be much simpler. Since the AMA has deemed obesity itself to be a disease, it seems to fit within the LAD’s definition of disability as long as being overweight can be considered a form of malformation or disfigurement. Likewise, it seems to fall within the NYHRL’s definition since it is a physical or medical condition resulting from an anatomical condition that can be demonstrated by medically accepted clinical techniques.

Of course, how much this change actually will impact disability discrimination law is an issue that eventually will be decided by the courts. The bottom line is that the AMA’s new resolution could help extend protection against disability discrimination to additional employees who previously were not legally protected.

Supreme Court Limits Definition of “Supervisor” Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law

July 1, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Last week, the United States Supreme Court adopted a narrow definition of who is a “supervisor” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). Title VII is a federal law that prohibits discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex or religion. The Court ruled that an employee has to have the authority to take tangible employment actions against another employee to be considered his or her supervisor. A tangible employment action is a significant job action such as hiring, firing, promoting, demoting, transferring or suspending an employee.

It is important to note that this narrower definition of supervisor probably does not apply under New Jersey or New York City law, and may not apply under New York law.

The definition of who is a supervisor under Title VII is significant because the Supreme Court has previously ruled that a different standard applies to determine when a company is liable for harassment committed by a supervisor than a coworker. Specifically, companies are strictly (directly) liable for a hostile work environment created by a supervisor if it results in an adverse employment action that has negative economic consequences, such as the employee being fired, demoted, or forced to quit. Alternatively, a company is vicariously (indirectly) liable for a supervisor’s harassment unless the company can prove (1) it made reasonable efforts to prevent and correct the harassment, such as having and enforcing an effective anti-harassment policy, and (2) the victim of the harassment unreasonably failed to take advantage of opportunities to prevent or correct the hostile work environment.

In contrast, an employer can be held liable for harassment by a coworker or subordinate under Title VII only if it was negligent in preventing the creation or continuation of a hostile work environment. In other words, the victim must prove the company “knew or reasonably should have known about the harassment but failed to take remedial action.” The Supreme Court explained that evidence of negligence can include the fact that an employer “did not monitor the workplace, failed to respond to complaints, failed to provide a system for registering complaints, or effectively discouraged complaints from being filed would be relevant.”

Maetta Vance, the employee in the case the Supreme Court decided, brought a claim of racial harassment and discrimination against her former employer, Ball State University. The University sought to dismiss the case, arguing it was not legally responsible for the alleged harassment because the person who committed it was not Ms. Vance’s supervisor. The lower courts both agreed.

Ms. Vance asked the Supreme Court to adopt the United States Equal Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)’s broader definition of “supervisor,” which includes anyone who exercises significant control over the employee’s daily work. But, in Vance v. Ball State University, the Court rejected her position and ruled that generally only someone who has the authority to take an adverse employment action that has a negative economic consequence toward an employee can be considered a supervisor under Title VII. The Court also indicated that, under certain circumstances, an individual who does not officially have the authority to take an adverse employment action can be considered a supervisor if he/she has “substantial input” into those types of decisions in a way that indicates the employer delegated that power to him/her.

Since Ms. Vance admitted her harasser did not have the authority to fire, demote, or discipline her, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of her case.

New Jersey Court Reverses Dismissal of Sexual Orientation Discrimination Case

May 7, 2013 | by Jonathan I. Nirenberg

Earlier this month the New Jersey Appellate Division permitted an employee to continue with his sexual orientation discrimination claim against his former employer, finding there is enough evidence to support his claim.

Ronald Savoie, who happens to be gay, had a distinguished career as a teacher at The Lawrenceville School for more than two decades. He lived in a house owned by the school with his partner, Richard Bierman. In 2002, eight school buildings and grounds employees entered Mr. Savoie’s basement to repair a broken water main outside his house. In the basement, they saw some sort of sexual apparatus hanging from chains on the ceiling. Some of the employees also described seeing other items in the basement including a computer, a tripod without a camera, and videotapes.

A year later, when the school was replacing the condensing units and water heaters in the houses on Mr. Savoie’s street, several of the employees who had been in his basement the year before indicated they were uncomfortable returning to his house. When they described to their supervisor what they had seen in Mr. Savoie’s basement the year before, they listed additional items including a video camera, a television, a bed with mirrors, latex gloves, and diapers. Their boss repeated this information to the school’s Dean of Faculty, its Associate Head Master, and its Chief Financial Officer (CFO).

The Dean then met with Mr. Savoie, gave him a pre-written resignation letter, and told him he would be fired unless he agreed to resign. According to Mr. Savoie, the Dean accused him of transmitting sexually explicit images over the Internet, and indicated he could not trust him with students as a result. Although Mr. Savoie signed the resignation letter, he attempted to rescind it the next day. The school rejected his attempt to withdraw his resignation.

Mr. Savoie then sued the school and several of its employees, claiming they fired him because of his sexual orientation, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). In response, the school claimed it asked Ms. Savoie to resign because it believed he was sending sexually explicit pictures of activities taking place in his basement over the Internet, in violation of the school’s standards of personal and professional behavior, which it claims jeopardized its reputation. The trial court eventually dismissed Mr. Savoie’s case, concluding that even if he did not actually send sexually explicit materials over the Internet, the school reasonably believed he had done so and legitimately fired him as a result.

However, in Savoie v. Lawrenceville School, the Appellate Division reversed. It ruled that although a jury could reach the same conclusion as the trial judge, it also could determine that the school would not have reacted the same way if Mr. Savoie was heterosexual. The appellate court relied on the fact that (1) the school relied on the secondhand information from the supervisor of the employees who were in Mr. Savoie’s basement instead of conducting a proper investigation; (2) Mr. Savoie disputes the school’s claim that he admitted sending sexually explicit images over the Internet; (3) the school’s Associate Head Master made a disparaging comment about Bierman’s lifestyle, thereby implicitly criticizing Mr. Savoie’s lifestyle; and (4) the school looked the other way when a high ranking administrator resumed an adulterous affair even after he had been warned the affair violated the school’s policy regarding personal and professional behavior and was grounds for termination. Accordingly, the Appellate Division sent Mr. Savoie’s case back to the trial court for a trial.