New Jersey Employment Lawyer Blog

In a ground-breaking employment law decision, New Jersey's Appellate Division recently ruled that an employee can sue for a hostile work environment if his employer harasses him based on a mistaken belief that he belongs to a legally-protected group. Specifically, the court allowed an employee to proceed with his claim that his supervisors harassed him because they mistakenly believed he is Jewish, even though he is not.

Mr. Cowher's Supervisors Harassed Him Because They Thought He Was Jewish

Myron Cowher worked as a truck driver for Carson & Roberts for approximately two years. His supervisors made anti-Semitic slurs to him on a daily basis. For example, they referred to him as "Jew Bag," "Jew Bastard," "you Hebrew," "bagel meister," "Jew burger" and "f---ing Hebrew." They even told him "[i]f you were a German, we would burn you in the oven." Mr. Cowher's supervisors apparently made these comments because they thought he was Jewish.

New Jersey Law Prohibits Discrimination Based on Perceived Membership in a Legally-Protected Group

The trial court dismissed Mr. Cowher's case because he could not prove his employer harassed him because he is a member of any legally-protected group. However, in Cowher v. Carson & Roberts, the Appellate Division reversed that decision. It explained that it is well recognized that it is illegal for a company to harass or discriminate against an employee based on its mistaken belief that that he has a disability. It found there is no reason to treat disabilities differently than other legally-protected categories, such as race or religion. It therefore ruled that Mr. Cowher can proceed with his harassment claim on the theory that his supervisors harassed him because they mistakenly perceived him to be Jewish.

The appellate court indicated that the relevant question to determine whether this form of harassment violates of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) is the impact the derogatory comments would have had on a reasonable person who is Jewish, rather than the impact on an employee whose employer mistakenly believes he is Jewish. However, to prove that he is entitled to recover damages, Mr. Cowher will have to prove that he was offended by the comments, and that they caused him emotional distress damages and/or some other harm.

Although the case addresses discrimination based on being Jewish, its reasoning appears to apply to any form of harassment that is prohibited by the LAD. Thus, for example, it seems to mean it would be unlawful for a company to harass an employee because it mistakenly believes he is a particular age, race, or sexual orientation.

[Extended Body]: If you have experienced harassment or discrimination at work in either New Jersey and New York, we are here to help. Please contact the Nirenberg Law Firm to learn more about your employment law rights.

Continue reading "New Jersey Prohibits Harassment Based on Mistaken Belief that Employee is Jewish" »

New Jersey's Appellate Division recently ruled that when a company does not follow through with the plan it used to justify firing an employee, such as its plan for a reorganization or reduction in force, that failure can be enough for a jury to conclude that the decision to fire the employee was discriminatory.

In Abraham v. American International Group, Inc., Lisbi Abraham sued American International Group (AIG) claiming the company fired him because of his race and national origin, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). Mr. Abraham is a United States citizen of Indian descent. His was AIG's Chief Technology Officer (CTO) for the company's Domestic Brokerage and Information Services Groups. The LAD prohibits companies from firing employees based on their race or national origin.

In October 2005, AIG issued a report which concluded that it should eliminate 13 of its 20 CTO positions. In May 2006, AIG fired Mr. Abraham. AIG claimed it fired him because it was restructuring the Information Services Group to eliminate duplication and redundancy of job functions.

The Appellate Division explained that one way a plaintiff can prove discrimination is by offering evidence that discredits the employer's explanation for its actions. It ruled that Mr. Abraham had evidence to discredit AIG's claim that it fired him as part of a job restructuring. In particular, although several other people temporarily took over Mr. Abraham's job duties after he was fired, none of his functions were permanently transferred to other employees. Since there is evidence that Mr. Abraham's job never was merged into another job, as AIG claimed it intended to do when it justified firing Mr. Abraham, the Appellate Division ruled that a jury could conclude that AIG fired him because of his race or national origin.

The Appellate Division was careful to recognize that courts should not act as "super-personnel departments," or second-guess employment decisions such as job restructuring. However, it also recognized that companies can violate the LAD in many "subtle and nuanced ways," that there is rarely "smoking gun" evidence to prove discrimination, and that often there are not even any overt acts of discrimination. The court concluded that, after a trial, a jury could find that AIG discriminated against Mr. Abraham because of his race or national origin, or it could find that AIG's decision to fire him was legitimate. It therefore sent his case back for a trial.

Continue reading "Employer's Failure to Follow Job Restructuring Plan Could Prove Discrimination" »

Last week, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that statistical evidence could be enough to prove that Newark's residency requirement for its non-uniformed employees has a disparate impact based on race. A disparate impact claim is when someone claims that a seemingly neutral policy has a disproportionately negative impact on a particular legally protected group.

Specifically, in Meditz v. City of Newark, Gregory Meditz sued Newark after it refused to hire him as its Housing Development Analyst because he lives in Rutherford, rather than in Newark, New Jersey. He claims the Newark's residency requirement for its non-uniformed employees is illegal because it has a disparate impact on non-Hispanic whites, since the population of Newark does not reflect the racial mix of the relevant job market. He alleges that fewer non-Hispanic white employees work for Newark as non-uniformed employees because of the residency requirement.

To support his claim, Mr. Meditz used statistics showing there is a much lower percentage of non-Hispanic white employees who work for Newark in non-uniformed positions (1) than there are in the general population of Newark, (2) than work for Newark in uniformed positions than non-uniformed positions, (3) than work for the government and private companies in Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Morris, Passaic, and Union Counties, and (4) than work for the Essex County government in Newark.

Despite this evidence, the District Court dismissed Mr. Meditz's employment discrimination lawsuit, finding his statistical evidence was not enough to prove that Newark's residency requirement has a disparate impact based on race. The lower court relied on the fact that "Newark is New Jersey's largest city with over 270,000 residents, 38,950 of whom are White." It concluded that "[g]iven its diversity and large population, there is no need to redefine the relevant labor market past city limits for purposes of Title VII analysis." Title VII is a federal employment law that prohibits employers from discriminating based on an employee's race, color, national origin, or gender.

However, the Court of Appeals disagreed and allowed Mr. Meditz to proceed with his case. It found his statistical evidence might be enough to prove that Newark's residency requirement has a disparate impact based on race. However, it ruled that the District Court has to determine the relevant labor market before it can determine whether Mr. Meditz's statistics prove his claim. The Third Circuit concluded that the District Court must consider factors including geographic location, available transportation to Newark, commuting patterns, and where employees working for private companies in Newark live.

If Mr. Meditz can prove that Newark's residency requirement has a disparate impact based on race, then Newark's only defense would be that it has a "business necessity" for having a residency policy. That means Newark would have to prove that the hiring criteria "must effectively measure the minimum qualifications for successful performance of the job in question." Otherwise, its residency requirement would have an illegal disparate impact based on race, in violation of Title VII.

Continue reading "Third Circuit Finds Newark Hiring Practice Might Discriminate Based on Race" »

On August 29, 2011, in Bowers v. New Jersey Judiciary, Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth Vicinage, New Jersey's Appellate Division reversed a trial court's decision dismissing Thomas Bower's lawsuit against his former employer, the New Jersey Judiciary. Thomas Bowers, an African-American, worked for the New Jersey Judiciary as an Information Technology Analyst. He claimed the Judiciary failed to promote him to Acting IT Manager and subjected him to a hostile work environment because of his race. Mr. Bowers was the only African-American in Monmouth County's IT Division. In fact, there were no other African-American IT managers in the entire New Jersey Judiciary, and only one other racial minority, an Asian Indian.

Beginning in July 2005, Mr. Bowers' supervisor took an extended medical leave. Shortly after, the Judiciary asked Mr. Bowers to take over the duties of IT Manager. This decision was subsequently recommended by Monmouth County's Assignment Judge. Mr. Bowers performed the duties of the IT supervisor for approximately 8 months.

But when the Judiciary sought to formally appoint him as its Acting IT Manager, the Assistant Director of Technical Services and Operations, Jonathon Massey, gave a very negative opinion of Mr. Bowers, including claiming he "doesn't understand simple technical things," he "is lazy and stands around and watches others do the work," and that another supervisor described him as a "cocky, arrogant, lazy, weasel, creep" who "does what he wants, doesn't tell the truth" and has a "chip on his shoulder." Not surprisingly, Mr. Bowers was not formally named the Acting IT Manager. However, informally he continued to perform the responsibilities of the IT Manager until April 2006, when the Judiciary named Troy Fitzpatrick its new permanent IT Manager.

After Mr. Fitzpatrick became the IT Manager, he gave Mr. Bowers assignments that were normally given to lower level and less senior IT employees, like answering Help Desk calls and creating a Help Desk manual. Mr. Fitzpatrick told Mr. Bowers that he could not assign work to anyone else, and also told him he could not leave his desk for any reason unless he found someone else to cover the Help Desk. Mr. Fitzpatrick also sought information from other employees about Mr. Bowers' work ethic, and was always short and curt when he spoke to Mr. Bowers, as if he did not want to speak to him. In comparison, Mr. Fitzpatrick treated a newly hired white male employee much better than Mr. Bowers, such as giving him less work and not limiting his ability to leave his desk.

The trial court dismissed Mr. Bowers' race discrimination and harassment claims because he was not subject to racial epithets and there was no direct evidence of race discrimination, he did not have enough evidence to prove either of those claims. But the Appellate Division disagreed. It explained that "discrimination rarely rears its ugly head directly. Rather, it typically manifests itself in subtle ways." In particular, it found that a jury could find that Mr. Massey's extremely negative recommendation was false and discriminatory. It noted that Mr. Massey admitted he knew very little about Mr. Bowers. Instead, it ruled that only a jury can decide whether the Judiciary's decision not to make Mr. Bowers its Acting IT Manager was discriminatory.

Next week, I will discuss Mr. Bowers' retaliation claim. In a subsequent article, I will discuss his claim that the judiciary failed to accommodate his disability.

Continue reading "IT Professional Given Second Chance in Race Discrimination Case Against New Jersey Judiciary" »

On February 28, 2011, New Jersey's Appellate Division issued an unpublished opinion ruling that a jury should decide whether the New Jersey Department of Corrections ("DOC") retaliated against one of its employees, Bienvenido Montalvo.

Mr. Montalvo Filed a National Origin Discrimination Complaint With the EEOC

Mr. Montalvo worked for DOC as a senior corrections officer at Northern State Prison ("NSP"). On October 5, 2004,he filed a complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in Newark, New Jersey. He claimed several superior officers harassed and retaliated against him because of his national origin, Hispanic/Puerto Rican. The EEOC sent Mr. Montalvo's Charge of Discrimination to DOC in Trenton on October 7. It is unclear exactly when NSP received a copy of Mr. Montalvo's Notice of Charge of Discrimination, but the evidence seems to indicate that DOC received it sometime in October 2004.DOC Unfairly Disciplined Mr. Montalvo After He Complained About Discrimination

On November 4, 2004, Mr. Montalvo received a notice of disciplinary action charging him with conduct unbecoming and other sufficient causes for allegedly assaulting a prisoner on October 28. DOC suspended him without pay pending a hearing, and told him he was subject to potentially being fired. However, after a hearing in December 2004, the charges against Mr. Montalvo were dismissed because DOC failed to present any evidence to support them. Mr. Montalvo was then reinstated to his job with full back pay.

The Trial Court Dismissed Mr. Montalvo's Retaliation Claim

Mr. Montalvo sued DOC and six of its employees alleging national origin discrimination and retaliation in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), among other claims. However, the trial court dismissed his retaliation claim, finding he did not have enough evidence to support it.

The Appellate Division Reinstated Mr. Montalvo's Retaliation Claim

The Appellate Division disagreed, and instead ruled that Mr. Montalvo is entitled to a trial. It concluded that he suffered an "adverse employment action" because a reasonable employee might not file a discrimination claim if he knew his employer would respond by falsely accusing him of committing an assault, suspending him without pay, and forcing him to defend himself at a disciplinary hearing. It further found it is possible for a jury to find from the evidence that DOC knew about Mr. Montalvo's EEOC complaint when it disciplined him. The Court concluded that a reasonable jury could believe the discipline was retaliatory, based on evidence including the fact that (1) DOC suspended him less than a month after he filed his Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC; (2) the officers who brought the disciplinary charges against him told him he had a target on his back and they wanted to fire him in October 2004; and (3) DOC sought to discipline him despite a videotape and several reports from the day of the alleged assault which confirmed he had done nothing wrong. Accordingly, the Appellate Division sent Mr. Montalvo's case back to the trial court for a jury trial.

Continue reading "New Jersey Appellate Division Reinstates Retaliation Claim Against Department of Corrections" »

The statute of limitations under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD") is two years. Ordinarily, that means you must file your lawsuit within two years after (1) a "discrete act" of discrimination such as being fired, demoted, or suspended, or (2) the last act of a pattern of harassment. But on December 10, 2010, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that an exception called the "discovery rule" can extend the LAD's statute of limitations. The discovery rule applies when an employee is unaware that he suffered an injury, or unaware that someone else is at fault for causing his injury, until after the statute of limitations has expired.

The case, Henry v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, involves an African American employee, Lula Henry, who was hired for an entry-level nursing position with Trenton State Psychiatric Hospital in April 2004. Ms. Henry claims Trenton State did not place her in a more senior position because of her race, in violation of the LAD.

According to Ms. Henry, she first suspected she was the victim of race discrimination in 2004, but did not have any concrete evidence at the time. It was not until 2006 that she learned that (1) another black nurse had filed a race discrimination lawsuit against Trenton State, and (2) Trenton State had hired a Caucasian nurse with the same credentials as her for higher level job classification, which was inconsistent with Trenton State's explanation for why it did not place her in a higher level position.

In July 2007, Ms. Henry filed a race discrimination lawsuit against the New Jersey Department of Human Services, its Acting Commissioner, Trenton State Psychiatric Hospital, and Trenton State's Chief Executive Officer. The trial court dismissed her case based on the statute of limitations since she filed her case more than two years after the alleged discriminatory actions. On appeal, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of her case.

But the New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed. It found the fact that Trenton State gave Ms. Henry a non-discriminatory explanation for why it placed her in an entry-level position may have led her not to pursue the issue until she learned new information that caused her to believe Trenton State's explanation was false. It found the circumstances could be enough that the LAD's two year statute of limitations would not begin until Ms. Henry learned the new information that supported her suspicion that Trenton State had discriminated against her because of her race. As a result, it sent her case back to the trial court to conduct a hearing. At that hearing, Ms. Henry will try to prove she did not have a "reasonable suspicion" of race discrimination, and that a reasonable person in her position could not have discovered a basis for a discrimination claim through reasonable diligence. If she is able to prove this, then she will be able to proceed with her discrimination case even though she filed it more than two years after the alleged discrimination occurred.

Continue reading ""Discovery Rule" Can Extend Statute of Limitations Under New Jersey Law Against Discrimination" »

What is a Disparate Impact Case?

A disparate impact case is one in which an employee claims the employer's policy has an unequal negative impact based on an unlawful reason. Unlawful factors include race, national origin, gender, age, pregnancy, and disability, among others.

For example, an employer might use a test to decide which employees it hires or promotes. Even if the employer has no intent to discriminate, the test might disproportionately select fewer employees in a legally protected group. For example, if a significantly lower percentage of African-American or Hispanic job candidates are hired or promoted based on the test results, then the test might be considered to have a disparate impact based on race. A job criteria that has a disparate impact based on an illegal factor violates the law unless the company can prove it has a "business necessity" for using the criteria.

In Lewis v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court discussed the filing deadline for a disparate impact case. As a starting point, the Court noted that federal law requires employees to file a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within either 300 days after the discrimination occurred. Otherwise, the employee's claim will be dismissed. (Note: in some states the EEOC filing deadline is only 180 days).

Other anti-discrimination laws have different filing deadlines. For example, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination has a 2 year statute of limitations, and both the New York Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law have 3 year statutes of limitations.

The Lewis Case

Lewis v. City of Chicago involves the Chicago Fire Department. The Department used a written exam to decide which job candidates it hired. The test undisputedly had a disparate impact against African-American job candidates. Six African-American job applicants filed Charges of Discrimination with the EEOC.

Each of the Charges of Discrimination was filed more than 300 days after Chicago announced how it planned to use the test results. However, Chicago continued to use the test results to hire job candidates for the next six years. At least one of the employees filed a Charge of Discrimination within 300 days after the Department hired a job candidate based on the test results. Accordingly, the trial court found that the Charge of Discrimination was timely.

After a trial, the Court found the test had a disparate impact on the basis of race. It also ruled that the employer did not prove a business necessity for the test. As a result, it ordered the Fire Department to hire 132 African-American employees who had applied for jobs.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. It found the Charge of Discrimination should have been filed within 300 days after the City announced how it planned to use the test results. As a result, it dismissed the case.

But the Supreme Court disagreed, and reinstated the trial judge's ruling. It found there was a continuing violation, and the Charge of Discrimination was filed on time because it was filed within 300 days after the City used the test results to make a hiring decision. As a result, it reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision.