New Jersey Employment Lawyer Blog

A new amendment to an important employment law was included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, a law which you might know better as President Obama's most recent Economic Stimulus package. Under that law, the United States government will pay 65% of an employee's health insurance premiums for up to nine months after an employee is involuntarily fired or laid off. This new provision is part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). It applies to individuals who are covered by COBRA who involuntarily lose (or lost) their jobs between September 1, 2008 and December 31, 2009. It even covers individuals who have already turned down COBRA benefits since September 1, 2008.

The government stipend toward COBRA benefits is reduced for individuals who make more than $125,000 per year and married couples who file joint tax returns and earn more than $250,000 combined. The benefits phase out completely for individuals who make more than $145,000 and for couples filing joint tax returns who earn more than $290,000 combined.

COBRA is a law that allows many employees, as well as their spouses and dependent children, to continue to receive health insurance benefits for at least 18 months (and under certain circumstances, for as long as 36 months) after they lose their health insurance coverage from an employer. COBRA allows those individuals to pay for their health insurance based on the employer's group rates, plus a 2% administrative cost. Prior to the stimulus package, employees who elected to continue their health insurance benefits under COBRA had to pay the entire cost of keeping their medical benefits out of their own pockets. Employees who are eligible for the new government subsidy only have to pay 35% of that cost.

COBRA itself applies to individuals who are eligible for health insurance benefits from a company with at least 20 employees. However, the new government subsidy applies to individuals in states that have "comparable continuation coverage" that apply to smaller companies (often referred to as mini-COBRA laws). That includes employees in both New York and New Jersey.

Although the new government subsidy only applies to individuals who were laid off or who are otherwise involuntarily terminated, COBRA applies to employees who are no longer covered by a company's health insurance plan because their employment voluntarily or involuntarily ends for any reason other than "gross misconduct," or their hours were reduced. It also applies to spouses and dependent children if the are no longer entitled to health benefits from their spouse's or parent's employer because (1) the employee voluntarily or involuntarily left his employment for any reason other than "gross misconduct," (2) the employee's hours were reduced below the minimum to qualify for benefits, (3) the employee becomes entitled to Medicare; (4) the employee divorces or legally separates from his or her spouse; (5) the employee dies; or (6) in the case of a dependent child, because the child is no longer eligible for benefits under the employer's health insurance plan.

If you have recently lost your job, or have another question about your rights under COBRA, you should contact an employment lawyer in your area to discuss who can help you understand your employment law rights.

Imagine a company's Vice President offered you a great new job. Better yet, he or she offered you a guaranteed written one year employment contract that provides a generous salary and benefits. You signed the contract and started the job, only to be told by someone in the human resources department that the Vice President who hired you did not have the authority to offer you an employment contract, the company has hired someone else for your job, and you are fired. Do you have a legal claim for the company breaching your employment contract?

The answer is not so simple. Generally, the law only holds a company responsible for contracts which are made by someone who actually has the authority to enter into that type of contract on the company's behalf. For example, if an employee has the authority to hire employees, then the company ordinarily must honor the employment contacts he or she enters into on the company's behalf. However, if an employee tries to enter into an agreement on behalf of the company without having the authority to do, then the company is generally not bound by that agreement.

But what about when an employee who does not actually have the authority to hire, but reasonably appears to have that authority? The law in many states, including New York and New Jersey, recognizes that companies sometimes should be bound when they allow people to reasonably believe that a corporation's employee has more authority than he or she actually has. Under the doctrine of "apparent authority," a company potentially can be held legally responsible when it allows others to reasonably believe that someone else had the authority to act on the company's behalf. The law recognizes that often when a company's representative has the apparent authority to act on the company's behalf, the company should be legally bound by the representative's actions. Accordingly, since you reasonably believed the Vice President had the authority to hire you, at least in some states you would at least have a good argument to enforce your employment contract based on the Vice President's apparent authority to hire you.

It is important to note that the applicability of the doctrine of apparent authority is very fact specific, and that the law varies from state to state and from case to case. If you believe your employment law rights may have been violated, you should contact an experienced who can evaluate your case and help you to enforce your legal rights.

On January 26, 2009, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits retaliation against employees who speak out about harassment while answering questions as part of a company's internal harassment investigation.

The case, Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, involved a sexual harassment investigation by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (Metro). Metro began investigating rumors of sexual harassment by one of its employee, Gene Hughes. During the investigation, a human resources representative asked an employee, Vicky Crawford, if she had witnessed any inappropriate behavior by Mr. Hughes. In response, Ms. Crawford described several examples of Mr. Hughes sexually harassing conduct toward her. During the investigation, two other Metro employees also indicated that Mr. Hughes had sexually harassed them.

Metro took no disciplinary action against Hughes. However, shortly after it completed the investigation, it fired Ms. Crawford and the two other women who accused Mr. Hughes of sexual harassment. Metro claims it fired Ms. Crawford for embezzlement.

After Metro fired her, Ms. Crawford filed a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and eventually sued. She alleged that Metro fired her in retaliation for reporting Mr. Hughes' sexual harassment.

The United States District Court dismissed Ms. Crawford's case, finding that her complaints of sexual harassment were not protected by Title VII because she did not initiate the complaint, but rather answered questions during an investigation initiated by her employer. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with the District Court, and affirmed the dismissal of Ms. Crawford's case. However, the United States Supreme Court reversed that decision, reinstated Ms. Crawford's case, and sent it back to the District Court for further proceedings.

In its legal analysis, the Supreme Court noted that Title VII includes two provisions that make it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee who reports workplace race or gender discrimination. The first of those provisions, which the Supreme Court referred to as the "opposition clause," makes it unlawful to retaliate against any employee because she opposed any practice that Title VII makes unlawful. The other anti-retaliation provision, which the Supreme Court referred to as the "participation clause," makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee because she filed a charge of discrimination, or because she testified, assisted, or participated in any investigation, proceeding or hearing pursuant to Title VII.

The Supreme Court based its decision in Crawford on the opposition clause, as opposed to the participation clause. The Court concluded that Ms. Crawford's statements were made in opposition to Mr. Hughes' sexual harassment since she expressed her disapproval with his behavior. In support of its position, the Supreme Court relied on an EEOC guideline which states that "'[w]hen an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in ... a form of employment discrimination, that communication' virtually always 'constitutes the employee's opposition to the activity.'" Notably, the Court indicated that protected opposition would include "refusing to follow a supervisor's order to fire a junior worker for discriminatory reasons," suggesting that the opposition protects employees who verbally or orally object to discrimination, but also to employees who refuse to participate in discriminatory practices.